Files
web-terminal/agent/src/health/probe.ts
Yaojia Wang e7f3bd05f0 feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation
Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.

Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)

Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)

Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install

iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)

Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403

Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 16:11:13 +02:00

183 lines
7.4 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Native-tunnel health probe — TASK B4/H4 (PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION §3.2 / §5, INV9).
*
* Reports four independent sub-checks that together say whether this host's native frp tunnel is
* actually serving:
* (a) frpcAlive — the supervised frpc child process is running;
* (b) baseAppReachable — the loopback base app answers `GET http://127.0.0.1:PORT` (loopback ONLY);
* (c) proxyStarted — frpc logged a "start proxy success" line (control channel + proxy up);
* (d) certFresh — the frp-client leaf's `notAfter` is beyond the renewal window (not expiring).
*
* Every side effect is an INJECTABLE seam (process-liveness checker, loopback HTTP probe, log
* scanner, clock) so the logic is pure and offline-testable. The status renderer emits ONLY
* non-secret identifiers (subdomain, host id, cert expiry date, boolean flags) — NEVER keys, certs,
* tokens, or CSRs (INV9). No `console.log`.
*/
/** Default renewal window: 8h — one third of the 24h host frp-client TTL (renew at ~2/3 TTL). */
export const DEFAULT_CERT_RENEW_WINDOW_MS = 8 * 60 * 60 * 1000
/** frpc emits this line on the control channel once a proxy is registered and forwarding. */
export const FRPC_START_SUCCESS_RE = /start proxy success/i
/** Loopback host the base-app probe targets — hardcoded so the probe can never reach off-host. */
export const LOOPBACK_PROBE_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
const MIN_PORT = 1
const MAX_PORT = 65535
/** The four independent sub-checks plus the derived overall verdict. */
export interface HealthReport {
/** The supervised frpc child is running. */
readonly frpcAlive: boolean
/** `GET http://127.0.0.1:PORT` returned a response (base app is up on loopback). */
readonly baseAppReachable: boolean
/** frpc logged "start proxy success" (the tunnel proxy is registered). */
readonly proxyStarted: boolean
/** The frp-client cert's `notAfter` is beyond the renewal window (not near expiry). */
readonly certFresh: boolean
/** True iff all four sub-checks pass. */
readonly healthy: boolean
}
/** Injectable side effects the probe consumes; each is independently faked in tests. */
export interface HealthProbeSeams {
/** Process-liveness checker (the supervisor exposes whether its frpc child is alive). */
readonly isFrpcAlive: () => boolean
/** Loopback HTTP probe of the base app; resolves true iff it answered ok. */
readonly probeBaseApp: () => Promise<boolean>
/** Returns the accumulated frpc stdout/log text to scan for the success line. */
readonly readFrpcLog: () => string
/** The stored frp-client leaf's `notAfter`, or null if no cert is available. */
readonly certNotAfter: () => Date | null
/** Current time (injected for deterministic expiry tests). */
readonly now: () => Date
}
export interface HealthProbeConfig {
/** Certs within this many ms of `notAfter` are "near expiry" (default 8h). */
readonly renewWindowMs?: number
}
/** Pure: true iff the frpc log contains a "start proxy success" line. */
export function frpcProxyStarted(logText: string): boolean {
return FRPC_START_SUCCESS_RE.test(logText)
}
/** Pure: true iff `notAfter` is strictly beyond the renewal window from `now` (not near expiry). */
export function certIsFresh(notAfter: Date | null, now: Date, renewWindowMs: number): boolean {
if (notAfter === null) return false
return notAfter.getTime() - now.getTime() > renewWindowMs
}
/** Minimal shape of a fetch response the loopback probe cares about. */
export interface LoopbackResponse {
readonly ok: boolean
}
/** Injectable loopback HTTP fetch (real wiring passes global `fetch`). */
export type LoopbackFetch = (url: string) => Promise<LoopbackResponse>
/**
* Probe the loopback base app with `GET http://127.0.0.1:PORT/`. The host is hardcoded loopback, so
* the probe can never reach an off-host target (anti-SSRF). Any thrown/rejected fetch — or a
* non-integer/out-of-range port — resolves to `false` rather than propagating (a probe never throws).
*/
export async function probeLoopbackBaseApp(port: number, fetchImpl: LoopbackFetch): Promise<boolean> {
if (!Number.isInteger(port) || port < MIN_PORT || port > MAX_PORT) return false
const url = `http://${LOOPBACK_PROBE_HOST}:${port}/`
try {
const res = await fetchImpl(url)
return res.ok
} catch {
return false
}
}
/** Run all four sub-checks and derive the overall verdict. Never throws (each seam is guarded). */
export async function runHealthProbe(
seams: HealthProbeSeams,
config: HealthProbeConfig = {},
): Promise<HealthReport> {
const renewWindowMs = config.renewWindowMs ?? DEFAULT_CERT_RENEW_WINDOW_MS
const frpcAlive = seams.isFrpcAlive()
const baseAppReachable = await seams.probeBaseApp()
const proxyStarted = frpcProxyStarted(seams.readFrpcLog())
const certFresh = certIsFresh(seams.certNotAfter(), seams.now(), renewWindowMs)
const healthy = frpcAlive && baseAppReachable && proxyStarted && certFresh
return { frpcAlive, baseAppReachable, proxyStarted, certFresh, healthy }
}
/** Non-secret identifiers safe to print in `status` (INV9): NO key/cert/token/CSR material. */
export interface StatusIdentifiers {
readonly subdomain: string | null
readonly hostId: string | null
readonly certNotAfter: Date | null
}
/**
* Render `status` lines from non-secret identifiers + a health report (INV9). Emits the subdomain,
* host id, cert EXPIRY DATE (never the cert bytes), and the boolean sub-check flags — never any key,
* cert, token, or CSR material.
*/
export function renderHealthStatus(
ids: StatusIdentifiers,
report: HealthReport,
): readonly string[] {
return [
`subdomain: ${ids.subdomain ?? '(none)'}`,
`host_id: ${ids.hostId ?? '(none)'}`,
`cert_expiry: ${ids.certNotAfter ? ids.certNotAfter.toISOString() : '(unknown)'}`,
`frpc_alive: ${report.frpcAlive}`,
`base_app_reachable: ${report.baseAppReachable}`,
`proxy_started: ${report.proxyStarted}`,
`cert_fresh: ${report.certFresh}`,
`healthy: ${report.healthy}`,
]
}
/** Default periodic health-monitor interval (30s). */
export const DEFAULT_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000
/** Minimal injectable interval timer (fake-timer-testable). */
export interface IntervalTimer {
setInterval(cb: () => void, ms: number): unknown
clearInterval(handle: unknown): void
}
const realIntervalTimer: IntervalTimer = {
setInterval: (cb, ms) => setInterval(cb, ms),
clearInterval: (h) => clearInterval(h as ReturnType<typeof setInterval>),
}
/** Handle to a running health monitor. */
export interface HealthMonitor {
stop(): void
}
/**
* Start a periodic health monitor: every `intervalMs`, run `probe()` and hand the report to
* `onReport` (the run-loop wires this to a redacting logger — non-secret lines only). A rejected
* probe is swallowed (a monitor must never crash the supervisor). `stop()` clears the interval.
*/
export function startHealthMonitor(
probe: () => Promise<HealthReport>,
onReport: (report: HealthReport) => void,
opts: { intervalMs?: number; timer?: IntervalTimer } = {},
): HealthMonitor {
const intervalMs = opts.intervalMs ?? DEFAULT_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS
const timer = opts.timer ?? realIntervalTimer
const handle = timer.setInterval(() => {
void probe()
.then(onReport)
.catch(() => {
/* a probe failure is itself an unhealthy signal; never let it crash the monitor */
})
}, intervalMs)
return {
stop(): void {
timer.clearInterval(handle)
},
}
}