Files
web-terminal/relay-e2e/test/helpers.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

56 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript

/** Shared test helpers (hex codec + Ed25519 host stub). */
import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519'
import type { AeadAlg, DeviceAuthProofProvider } from 'relay-contracts'
import { createHostHandshake, type HostHandshake } from '../src/handshake.js'
import { nobleEd25519Signer } from '../src/ed25519.js'
export function hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {
const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2)
for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16)
return out
}
export function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
return Array.from(bytes, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
}
export const utf8 = (s: string): Uint8Array => new TextEncoder().encode(s)
export const fromUtf8 = (b: Uint8Array): string => new TextDecoder().decode(b)
/** A deterministic Ed25519 host identity for handshake tests. */
export function makeHostIdentity(): { privateKey: Uint8Array; agentPubkey: Uint8Array } {
const privateKey = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey()
return { privateKey, agentPubkey: ed25519.getPublicKey(privateKey) }
}
/** A proof provider whose proofs are bound to the ephemeral binding material. */
export function boundProofProvider(): DeviceAuthProofProvider {
return {
async proofFor(hostId, binding) {
return `proof:${hostId}:${bytesToHex(binding.clientEphPub)}:${bytesToHex(binding.clientNonce)}`
},
}
}
/** Verify a bound proof matches the presented ephemeral binding (anti-replay). */
export function verifyBoundProof(
proof: string,
binding: { clientEphPub: Uint8Array; clientNonce: Uint8Array },
): boolean {
const expected = `${bytesToHex(binding.clientEphPub)}:${bytesToHex(binding.clientNonce)}`
return proof.startsWith('proof:') && proof.endsWith(expected)
}
export function makeHost(
privateKey: Uint8Array,
agentPubkey: Uint8Array,
supported: readonly AeadAlg[] = ['xchacha20-poly1305', 'aes-256-gcm'],
): HostHandshake {
return createHostHandshake({
signer: nobleEd25519Signer(privateKey),
agentPubkey,
supported,
verifyDeviceProof: async (proof, binding) => verifyBoundProof(proof, binding),
})
}