aa1912b962
RELAY-PHASE1 Wave A2/B/C/D/E (12-agent workflow, all tsc-clean, 314/314 tests pass): - A2: control-plane server.ts entry + boot/redis.ts revocation-bus wiring + start script. - B1: relay-run shared-store EnforceDeps (relay-auth ports over the SAME Postgres+Redis as P3). - B2: registry-backed MtlsVerifier (verifyAgentCert, fail-closed, INV14). - B3: store-backed RouteResolver (subdomain->hostId). - B4: Redis relay:revocations subscriber -> tunnel teardown (INV12). - B5: main-phase1.ts production entry (public bind, real TLS, async-mTLS prefetch bridge) + staging /auth/mint. - B6 (PARTIAL): relay-web operator login + browser DPoP; proof offered via term.dpop.<b64u> subprotocol. - C: agent dist/cli.js build (esbuild) + runTunnel run-loop + CliDeps. - D1: same-origin static serve of relay-web/public from the browser WSS. - E: systemd units + gen-ca/gen-capability-key/issue-tls-cert scripts + deploy/RUNBOOK.md. Adversarial review: all hard invariants PASS. Follow-ups (B7): close DPoP-subprotocol read on browser-server (blocks browser connect); rate-limit /auth/mint (F1); wire activeSessionCount (F2); scrub error logs (F5). Excludes unrelated public/style.css (concurrent iOS job).
146 lines
7.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
146 lines
7.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
#
|
|
# RELAY-PHASE1 · E (TASK E) — Private ENROLLMENT CA for agent mTLS.
|
|
#
|
|
# STAGING TEMPLATE. This mints the PRIVATE trust chain the rendezvous-relay uses to (a) verify agent
|
|
# client certs (SPIFFE mTLS, INV14) and (b) present the relay's agent-facing SERVER cert on
|
|
# AGENT_BIND_PORT so the dialing agent can authenticate the relay.
|
|
#
|
|
# *** THIS IS NOT LET'S ENCRYPT. *** The browser-facing :443 cert is public-web PKI and is issued
|
|
# by deploy/scripts/issue-tls-cert.sh. This CA is a SEPARATE, private trust root that must NEVER be
|
|
# a public CA — mixing them would let any web-PKI leaf enroll as an agent.
|
|
#
|
|
# Hierarchy produced (Ed25519, to match the control-plane dev signer's algorithm):
|
|
# root (self-signed, offline anchor)
|
|
# └── intermediate (signs agent SPIFFE leaves at CP /enroll, AND the relay agent-server cert)
|
|
# ├── relay agent-server leaf (TLS serverAuth, CN/SAN = the agent-facing host)
|
|
# └── (agent leaves are issued at runtime by the control-plane, not here)
|
|
#
|
|
# Outputs (0600 keys, 0644 certs) under CA_DIR (default /etc/relay/ca):
|
|
# root.key.pem root.cert.pem
|
|
# intermediate.key.pem intermediate.cert.pem <- CA_INTERMEDIATE_CERT_PATH (+ its key = the CP signer)
|
|
# agent-ca.bundle.pem = intermediate + root <- AGENT_CA_CHAIN_PATH / NODE_MTLS_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH
|
|
# agent-ca.cert.pem = intermediate cert <- AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH
|
|
# relay-agent-server.key.pem relay-agent-server.cert.pem (present on AGENT_BIND_PORT)
|
|
#
|
|
# Config via ENV only (no hardcoded hosts/ports/secrets):
|
|
# CA_DIR output dir (default /etc/relay/ca)
|
|
# AGENT_FACING_HOST REQUIRED — CN/SAN for the relay agent-server cert; the host the agent dials,
|
|
# e.g. "<sub>.<BASE_DOMAIN>" (must match RELAY_URL's host in the agent config).
|
|
# AGENT_FACING_IP OPTIONAL — extra IP SAN (e.g. 8.138.1.192) if the agent dials the raw IP.
|
|
# RELAY_TRUST_DOMAIN OPTIONAL — SPIFFE trust domain (recorded in a NOTE only; agent SPIFFE leaves
|
|
# are minted by the control-plane /enroll, not by this script).
|
|
# CA_DAYS_ROOT / CA_DAYS_INT / CA_DAYS_LEAF cert lifetimes (defaults 3650 / 1825 / 825).
|
|
#
|
|
# Verify (syntax): bash -n deploy/scripts/gen-agent-ca.sh
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
CA_DIR="${CA_DIR:-/etc/relay/ca}"
|
|
CA_DAYS_ROOT="${CA_DAYS_ROOT:-3650}"
|
|
CA_DAYS_INT="${CA_DAYS_INT:-1825}"
|
|
CA_DAYS_LEAF="${CA_DAYS_LEAF:-825}"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "${AGENT_FACING_HOST:-}" ]]; then
|
|
echo "FATAL: AGENT_FACING_HOST is required (CN/SAN of the relay agent-server cert)." >&2
|
|
echo " e.g. AGENT_FACING_HOST=term1.example.com bash $0" >&2
|
|
exit 2
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "FATAL: openssl not found on PATH." >&2; exit 3; }
|
|
|
|
umask 077
|
|
mkdir -p "${CA_DIR}"
|
|
cd "${CA_DIR}"
|
|
|
|
echo "== Enrollment CA (PRIVATE — not Let's Encrypt) into ${CA_DIR} =="
|
|
|
|
# ---- 1. Root CA (offline anchor) ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
if [[ ! -f root.key.pem ]]; then
|
|
openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out root.key.pem
|
|
fi
|
|
openssl req -x509 -new -key root.key.pem -days "${CA_DAYS_ROOT}" \
|
|
-subj "/O=web-terminal-relay/OU=agent-enrollment/CN=web-terminal Agent Enrollment Root" \
|
|
-addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" \
|
|
-addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign" \
|
|
-addext "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" \
|
|
-out root.cert.pem
|
|
|
|
# ---- 2. Intermediate CA (the control-plane's leaf-signing key in staging) --------------------------
|
|
# The CP dev in-process signer (CA_INTERMEDIATE_KMS_KEY_REF=dev-local) signs agent SPIFFE leaves with
|
|
# THIS intermediate key. In Phase 2 the intermediate key moves into a non-exportable KMS/HSM (§3.1).
|
|
if [[ ! -f intermediate.key.pem ]]; then
|
|
openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out intermediate.key.pem
|
|
fi
|
|
openssl req -new -key intermediate.key.pem \
|
|
-subj "/O=web-terminal-relay/OU=agent-enrollment/CN=web-terminal Agent Enrollment Intermediate" \
|
|
-out intermediate.csr.pem
|
|
cat > intermediate.ext <<'EXT'
|
|
basicConstraints = critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:0
|
|
keyUsage = critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign
|
|
subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
|
|
authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always
|
|
EXT
|
|
openssl x509 -req -in intermediate.csr.pem \
|
|
-CA root.cert.pem -CAkey root.key.pem -CAcreateserial \
|
|
-days "${CA_DAYS_INT}" -extfile intermediate.ext \
|
|
-out intermediate.cert.pem
|
|
|
|
# ---- 3. Trust bundle (intermediate + root) --------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# The relay walks leaf -> intermediate -> root, so the anchor (root) MUST be in the bundle
|
|
# (relay-auth verifyChain terminates at a self-signed root present in the set, INV14).
|
|
cat intermediate.cert.pem root.cert.pem > agent-ca.bundle.pem
|
|
cp intermediate.cert.pem agent-ca.cert.pem
|
|
|
|
# ---- 4. Relay agent-facing SERVER cert (presented on AGENT_BIND_PORT) -----------------------------
|
|
# The agent dials wss://<AGENT_FACING_HOST>:<AGENT_BIND_PORT> and pins THIS CA to authenticate the
|
|
# relay server. CN/SAN must equal the host the agent dials.
|
|
if [[ ! -f relay-agent-server.key.pem ]]; then
|
|
openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out relay-agent-server.key.pem
|
|
fi
|
|
openssl req -new -key relay-agent-server.key.pem \
|
|
-subj "/O=web-terminal-relay/OU=agent-data-plane/CN=${AGENT_FACING_HOST}" \
|
|
-out relay-agent-server.csr.pem
|
|
{
|
|
echo "basicConstraints = critical,CA:FALSE"
|
|
echo "keyUsage = critical,digitalSignature"
|
|
echo "extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth"
|
|
echo "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash"
|
|
echo "authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer"
|
|
if [[ -n "${AGENT_FACING_IP:-}" ]]; then
|
|
echo "subjectAltName = DNS:${AGENT_FACING_HOST},IP:${AGENT_FACING_IP}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "subjectAltName = DNS:${AGENT_FACING_HOST}"
|
|
fi
|
|
} > relay-agent-server.ext
|
|
openssl x509 -req -in relay-agent-server.csr.pem \
|
|
-CA intermediate.cert.pem -CAkey intermediate.key.pem -CAcreateserial \
|
|
-days "${CA_DAYS_LEAF}" -extfile relay-agent-server.ext \
|
|
-out relay-agent-server.cert.pem
|
|
|
|
# ---- 5. Permissions + summary ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
chmod 600 ./*.key.pem
|
|
chmod 644 ./*.cert.pem ./*.bundle.pem
|
|
rm -f ./*.csr.pem ./*.ext
|
|
|
|
cat <<SUMMARY
|
|
|
|
Enrollment CA ready in ${CA_DIR}. Wire these env paths (relay.env / control-plane.env):
|
|
|
|
CA_INTERMEDIATE_CERT_PATH = ${CA_DIR}/intermediate.cert.pem
|
|
NODE_MTLS_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH = ${CA_DIR}/agent-ca.bundle.pem
|
|
AGENT_CA_CERT_PATH = ${CA_DIR}/agent-ca.cert.pem
|
|
AGENT_CA_CHAIN_PATH = ${CA_DIR}/agent-ca.bundle.pem
|
|
|
|
relay agent-server cert = ${CA_DIR}/relay-agent-server.cert.pem
|
|
relay agent-server key = ${CA_DIR}/relay-agent-server.key.pem (0600)
|
|
intermediate signing key = ${CA_DIR}/intermediate.key.pem (0600 — the CP dev signer)
|
|
|
|
NOTE (staging integration seam, owned by the A-wave CP boot/ca-wiring, NOT by this script):
|
|
The control-plane's dev in-process signer must sign agent leaves with intermediate.key.pem so the
|
|
leaves chain to this bundle. CA_INTERMEDIATE_KMS_KEY_REF=dev-local selects the dev signer; point it
|
|
at ${CA_DIR}/intermediate.key.pem. Phase 2 replaces this with a KMS/HSM ref (§3.1).
|
|
SPIFFE trust domain for agent leaves = ${RELAY_TRUST_DOMAIN:-<RELAY_TRUST_DOMAIN unset>}.
|
|
|
|
*** root.key.pem is the offline trust anchor — after first use, move it OFF this host. ***
|
|
SUMMARY
|