2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
62 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
62 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest'
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import { createMemoryStores } from '../src/store/memory.js'
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import { createAuditLog, MAX_META_VALUE_LEN } from '../src/audit/log.js'
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import { createAccountRegistry } from '../src/registry/accounts.js'
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import { createHostRegistry } from '../src/registry/hosts.js'
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import { fingerprint } from '../src/ca/fingerprint.js'
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import { generateEd25519 } from '../src/util/crypto.js'
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describe('T14 audit log (INV10 zero payload)', () => {
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test('rejects a meta value carrying control/ANSI bytes (terminal payload guard)', async () => {
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const { audit } = createMemoryStores()
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const log = createAuditLog(audit)
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await expect(
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log.writeAuditEvent({
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action: 'attach',
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principalId: 'p',
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accountId: 'a',
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hostId: null,
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ts: new Date().toISOString(),
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meta: { out: 'ls[0m\r\noutput' }, // looks like shell output
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}),
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).rejects.toThrow(/payload guard/)
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})
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test('rejects an over-long meta value', async () => {
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const { audit } = createMemoryStores()
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const log = createAuditLog(audit)
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await expect(
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log.writeAuditEvent({
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action: 'manage',
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principalId: 'p',
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accountId: 'a',
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hostId: null,
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ts: new Date().toISOString(),
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meta: { blob: 'x'.repeat(MAX_META_VALUE_LEN + 1) },
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}),
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).rejects.toThrow(/payload guard/)
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})
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test('append-only: entries are queryable, no update/delete surface exists', async () => {
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const { audit } = createMemoryStores()
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const log = createAuditLog(audit)
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await log.writeAuditEvent({ action: 'kill', principalId: 'p', accountId: 'acct', hostId: 'h', ts: new Date().toISOString(), meta: {} })
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const rows = await log.queryAudit('acct', '1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2999-01-01T00:00:00.000Z')
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expect(rows.length).toBe(1)
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expect(Object.keys(log)).not.toContain('update')
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expect(Object.keys(log)).not.toContain('delete')
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})
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test('control-plane mutations emit audit entries (create + bind)', async () => {
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const stores = createMemoryStores()
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const log = createAuditLog(stores.audit)
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const accounts = createAccountRegistry({ accounts: stores.accounts, audit: log })
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const hosts = createHostRegistry({ hosts: stores.hosts, audit: log })
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const acct = await accounts.createAccount('pro')
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const { publicKeyRaw } = generateEd25519()
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await hosts.bindHost({ accountId: acct.accountId, subdomain: 'alice', agentPubkey: publicKeyRaw, enrollFpr: fingerprint(publicKeyRaw) })
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const rows = await log.queryAudit(acct.accountId, '1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2999-01-01T00:00:00.000Z')
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.action).sort()).toEqual(['account.create', 'host.bind'])
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})
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})
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