2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
39 lines
1.3 KiB
TypeScript
39 lines
1.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest'
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import { extractSubdomain } from '../data-plane/subdomain-router.js'
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const BASE = 'term.example.com'
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describe('extractSubdomain (T7, INV1 Host-confusion guard)', () => {
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test('single-label tenant resolves to the leftmost label', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('alice.term.example.com', BASE)).toBe('alice')
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})
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test('bare base domain → null (no tenant)', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('term.example.com', BASE)).toBeNull()
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})
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test('suffix-confusion attempt → null', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('alice.term.example.com.evil.com', BASE)).toBeNull()
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})
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test('multi-label (nested) subdomain → null (single-label tenant only)', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('a.b.term.example.com', BASE)).toBeNull()
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})
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test('case-insensitive host', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('ALICE.Term.Example.COM', BASE)).toBe('alice')
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})
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test('trailing dot tolerated', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('alice.term.example.com.', BASE)).toBe('alice')
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})
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test('host:port suffix is stripped before matching', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('alice.term.example.com:8443', BASE)).toBe('alice')
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})
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test('invalid DNS label → null', () => {
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expect(extractSubdomain('_bad.term.example.com', BASE)).toBeNull()
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})
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})
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