3020184054
The recoverable replay key was stable per (hostContentSecret, sessionId) while the agent-side sealer resets its deterministic-nonce seq to 0 on every restart/re-attach → two sealer generations sealed distinct plaintext under the SAME (key, nonce). Add a required 'epoch' to ReplayKeyParams, fold it into the K_content HKDF salt (sessionId U+001F epoch), mint a fresh epoch per createReplaySealer generation and expose it, and thread it through ReplaySource so the browser re-derives the matching key. Fresh epoch per generation ⇒ fresh key ⇒ seq=0 can never collide; recoverability within a generation is preserved. Touches relay-contracts/relay-e2e/agent/relay-web. Green: contracts 81, e2e 78, agent 133, web 99; tsc clean. Regression proves same seq-0 nonce, different key.
68 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
68 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import type { AuthorizedDeviceContext } from 'relay-contracts'
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import { unwrapAeadKey } from '../src/aead-key.js'
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import { deriveContentKey } from '../src/replay-key.js'
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import { buildClientHandshake, MemoryDevicePinStore } from '../src/keystore.js'
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import { createHostHandshake } from '../src/handshake.js'
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import { nobleEd25519Signer } from '../src/ed25519.js'
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import { boundProofProvider, makeHostIdentity, verifyBoundProof, bytesToHex } from './helpers.js'
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import * as publicSurface from '../src/index.js'
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function ctxFor(hostContentSecret: Uint8Array): AuthorizedDeviceContext {
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return {
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deviceAuthProofProvider: boundProofProvider(),
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pinStore: new MemoryDevicePinStore(),
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hostContentSecret,
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}
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}
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describe('T11 multi-device adapters (authenticated channel, NOT a QR)', () => {
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it('two authorized contexts (same secret) each complete a handshake + derive matching K_content', async () => {
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const id = makeHostIdentity()
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const secret = new Uint8Array(32).fill(0x55)
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const mkHost = () =>
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createHostHandshake({
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signer: nobleEd25519Signer(id.privateKey),
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agentPubkey: id.agentPubkey,
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supported: ['xchacha20-poly1305', 'aes-256-gcm'],
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verifyDeviceProof: async (p, b) => verifyBoundProof(p, b),
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})
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for (const label of ['deviceA', 'deviceB']) {
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const ch = buildClientHandshake(ctxFor(secret), 'h1', ['xchacha20-poly1305'])
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const host = mkHost()
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const hello = await ch.start()
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const hostHello = await host.onClientHello(hello)
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const result = await ch.onHostHello(hostHello, id.agentPubkey)
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expect(result.aead).toBe('xchacha20-poly1305')
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expect(label).toBeTruthy()
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}
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const kA = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm', epoch: 'gen-0' })
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const kB = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: 's', alg: 'aes-256-gcm', epoch: 'gen-0' })
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expect(bytesToHex(unwrapAeadKey(kA).raw)).toBe(bytesToHex(unwrapAeadKey(kB).raw))
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})
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it('no-QR assertion: the public surface exposes NO key→string/QR serializer', () => {
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const names = Object.keys(publicSurface)
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const forbidden = names.filter((n) => /qr|serializekey|exportkey|keytostring|tosharestring/i.test(n))
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expect(forbidden).toEqual([])
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})
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it('INV3: a context whose proof is unbound is rejected by the host gate (no session)', async () => {
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const id = makeHostIdentity()
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const ctx: AuthorizedDeviceContext = {
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deviceAuthProofProvider: { async proofFor() { return 'static-bearer-token' } },
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pinStore: new MemoryDevicePinStore(),
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hostContentSecret: new Uint8Array(32),
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}
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const ch = buildClientHandshake(ctx, 'h1', ['aes-256-gcm'])
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const host = createHostHandshake({
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signer: nobleEd25519Signer(id.privateKey),
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agentPubkey: id.agentPubkey,
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supported: ['aes-256-gcm'],
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verifyDeviceProof: async (p, b) => verifyBoundProof(p, b),
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})
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await expect(host.onClientHello(await ch.start())).rejects.toBeTruthy()
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})
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})
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