a5fa843f00
ClientTLS was the most security-sensitive package in the tree and the least covered, and it was not in the coverage gate at all (the gate's 4-package set predates it). 48 -> 84 tests against the real macOS keychain, serialized with a custom Testing trait after a @globalActor proved insufficient (actors yield at await, so cross-await critical sections got interleaved by other cases' cleanup). CI: the app/ipad/ios17 legs ran a bundle containing LiveServerSmokeTests, which spawns tsx, with no npm ci -- a hard failure, not a skip, on a bare checkout. Adds the missing iPad UI-test leg, and makes a missing iOS 17 runtime fail loudly instead of silently reporting green.
71 lines
3.2 KiB
Swift
71 lines
3.2 KiB
Swift
import Foundation
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import Security
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@testable import ClientTLS
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/// B4 · A KNOWN-GOOD PKCS#10 vector produced by OpenSSL, used to pin the
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/// hand-written DER encoder in `CertificateSigningRequest` byte-for-byte.
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///
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/// The ECDSA signature is randomized, so the stable part of a CSR is its
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/// `CertificationRequestInfo` — for a fixed key + fixed subject it is fully
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/// deterministic. That is what is pinned here: if our encoder ever drifts (a
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/// non-minimal length, a PrintableString instead of UTF8String, a wrong curve
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/// OID, an attributes SET that is not `A0 00`), the bytes stop matching
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/// OpenSSL's and this test fails.
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///
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/// Regenerate (OpenSSL 3.0.18, 2026-07-30):
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/// openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out fixed.key.pem
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/// openssl req -new -key fixed.key.pem -subj "/CN=web-terminal-device" \
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/// -outform DER -out csr.der
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/// # CertificationRequestInfo = the first child of the outer SEQUENCE:
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/// openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in csr.der -i # → offset 3, hl 3, l 128
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/// dd if=csr.der bs=1 skip=3 count=131 | base64
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/// # private key as X9.63 (0x04||X||Y||K) for SecKeyCreateWithData:
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/// openssl ec -in fixed.key.pem -text -noout # → pub(65) || priv(32)
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///
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/// SECURITY: `privateKeyX963Base64` is a THROWAWAY key generated solely for this
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/// vector. It protects nothing, is never enrolled, and is never written to a
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/// keychain (`SecKeyCreateWithData` keeps it in-process). Same convention as the
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/// embedded `device.p12` + passphrase in `ClientTLSFixtures`.
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enum KnownGoodCSR {
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static let subjectCommonName = "web-terminal-device"
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/// OpenSSL's `CertificationRequestInfo` DER for `privateKeyX963Base64` +
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/// `CN=web-terminal-device` (131 bytes).
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static let certificationRequestInfoBase64 = """
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MIGAAgEAMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMME3dlYi10ZXJtaW5hbC1kZXZpY2UwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjO\
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PQMBBwNCAARiJ8iQGXzCgho1TRYPNNcnqtgK/mrsNf+CAvoPbSH+12v1Q2OfVRgVPVYeS2AO3y87\
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Oel9Uxe2QsHluJnGoifSoAA=
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"""
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/// `0x04 || X(32) || Y(32) || K(32)` — the format `SecKeyCreateWithData`
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/// expects for an EC private key.
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static let privateKeyX963Base64 = """
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BGInyJAZfMKCGjVNFg801yeq2Ar+auw1/4IC+g9tIf7Xa/VDY59VGBU9Vh5LYA7fLzs56X1TF7ZC\
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weW4mcaiJ9Ko07ifqUA6io//Czd0XRMztqg+nY0OJcA1Y1LwoBMBbA==
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"""
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static var certificationRequestInfoDER: Data {
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Data(base64Encoded: certificationRequestInfoBase64, options: .ignoreUnknownCharacters)!
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}
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/// The fixed key as a `P256HardwareKey`, in-process only (no keychain item).
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static func fixedKey() throws -> SecureEnclaveKey {
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let blob = Data(
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base64Encoded: privateKeyX963Base64, options: .ignoreUnknownCharacters
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)!
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let attributes: [String: Any] = [
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kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,
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kSecAttrKeyClass as String: kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate,
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kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String: 256,
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]
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var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
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guard let key = SecKeyCreateWithData(blob as CFData, attributes as CFDictionary, &error)
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else {
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throw SecureEnclaveKeyError.keyGenerationFailed(
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String(describing: error?.takeRetainedValue())
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)
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}
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return SecureEnclaveKey(privateKey: key)
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}
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}
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