Files
web-terminal/control-plane/src/ca/csr.ts
Yaojia Wang 6efed9772e feat(control-plane): real X.509 agent leaf issuance (closes enrollment↔mTLS gap)
- ca/issue.ts: real X.509 v3 Ed25519 leaf with SPIFFE URI SAN, signed by the
  intermediate; SAN built via relay-auth spiffeIdFor so it can't drift
- ca/csr.ts: parse real PKCS#10 (agent's PEM) + async PoP verify; decodeCsrWire
  accepts PEM or base64(DER)
- main.ts/env.ts: real issuer when CA_INTERMEDIATE_KEY_PATH present, else dev fallback
- interop.test.ts: oracle proving relay-auth verifyAgentCert accepts the leaf (6 tests)
- deps: @peculiar/x509, reflect-metadata
2026-07-06 20:46:01 +02:00

148 lines
6.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* CSR handling (INV14) — REAL PKCS#10 over the agent's Ed25519 identity.
*
* The agent (`agent/src/enroll/csr.ts`) emits a standard PKCS#10 `CertificationRequest` signed by
* its in-process Ed25519 key. This module parses that request with `@peculiar/x509`, verifies its
* self-signature (proof-of-possession — the requester holds the private key for the embedded
* pubkey), and exposes the embedded raw Ed25519 public key so `sign.ts` can gate on
* embeddedPub == agentPubkey. Parsing/verification is FAIL-CLOSED and returns a UNIFORM result: any
* malformed/forged input yields `{ ok: false }` with no distinguishing detail (see `verifyCsrPoP`).
*
* `@peculiar/x509` uses `tsyringe`, which requires the `reflect-metadata` polyfill to be loaded
* before the library — hence the side-effect import on the first line (must stay first).
*/
import 'reflect-metadata'
import * as x509 from '@peculiar/x509'
import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto'
import { ed25519Sign, type KeyObject } from '../util/crypto.js'
// Ed25519 signing/verification runs on Node's WebCrypto (Ed25519 supported on Node 20+).
x509.cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto)
// --- Ed25519 SPKI constants -------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Fixed 12-byte SPKI prefix for an Ed25519 SubjectPublicKeyInfo; the raw key is the trailing 32. */
const ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX = Uint8Array.from([
0x30, 0x2a, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70, 0x03, 0x21, 0x00,
])
const ED25519_SPKI_LEN = ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX.length + 32 // 44
const RAW_ED25519_LEN = 32
// --- minimal DER encoding helpers (test/agent-side CSR construction) ---------------------------
function derLen(len: number): Uint8Array {
if (len < 0x80) return Uint8Array.from([len])
const bytes: number[] = []
let n = len
while (n > 0) {
bytes.unshift(n & 0xff)
n >>= 8
}
return Uint8Array.from([0x80 | bytes.length, ...bytes])
}
function tlv(tag: number, value: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
const len = derLen(value.length)
const out = new Uint8Array(1 + len.length + value.length)
out[0] = tag
out.set(len, 1)
out.set(value, 1 + len.length)
return out
}
function concat(chunks: readonly Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {
const out = new Uint8Array(chunks.reduce((s, c) => s + c.length, 0))
let off = 0
for (const c of chunks) {
out.set(c, off)
off += c.length
}
return out
}
const SEQUENCE = 0x30
const SET = 0x31
const INTEGER = 0x02
const BIT_STRING = 0x03
const OID = 0x06
const UTF8_STRING = 0x0c
const CONTEXT_0 = 0xa0
const OID_CN = Uint8Array.from([0x55, 0x04, 0x03]) // 2.5.4.3 commonName
const OID_ED25519 = Uint8Array.from([0x2b, 0x65, 0x70]) // 1.3.101.112 Ed25519
function spkiFromRawEd25519(raw: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
const algId = tlv(SEQUENCE, tlv(OID, OID_ED25519))
const pubBits = tlv(BIT_STRING, concat([Uint8Array.from([0x00]), raw]))
return tlv(SEQUENCE, concat([algId, pubBits]))
}
function nameFromCn(cn: string): Uint8Array {
const atv = tlv(SEQUENCE, concat([tlv(OID, OID_CN), tlv(UTF8_STRING, new TextEncoder().encode(cn))]))
return tlv(SEQUENCE, tlv(SET, atv))
}
/**
* Build a real PKCS#10 `CertificationRequest` DER for `embeddedPub`, self-signed by `privateKey`
* (Ed25519). Mirrors the agent's on-wire request shape (subject CN, empty attributes). Used by the
* control-plane's own tests to exercise the real parse/verify path; production requests come from
* the agent unchanged.
*/
export function buildCsr(privateKey: KeyObject, embeddedPub: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
const version = tlv(INTEGER, Uint8Array.from([0x00]))
const requestInfo = tlv(
SEQUENCE,
concat([version, nameFromCn('web-terminal-agent'), spkiFromRawEd25519(embeddedPub), tlv(CONTEXT_0, new Uint8Array(0))]),
)
const signature = ed25519Sign(privateKey, requestInfo)
const sigAlg = tlv(SEQUENCE, tlv(OID, OID_ED25519))
const sigBits = tlv(BIT_STRING, concat([Uint8Array.from([0x00]), signature]))
return tlv(SEQUENCE, concat([requestInfo, sigAlg, sigBits]))
}
// --- wire decoding + verification --------------------------------------------------------------
const PEM_CSR_RE = /-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----([\s\S]+?)-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----/
/**
* Decode the `csr` field as it arrives on the `/enroll` wire into raw PKCS#10 DER bytes. Accepts
* BOTH shapes the codebase produces: the agent sends a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` block, while the
* control-plane's own HTTP tests send `base64(DER)`. Both normalise to the same DER — this is the
* single place the wire encoding is interpreted (boundary validation, coding-style §Input).
*/
export function decodeCsrWire(wire: string): Uint8Array {
const pem = PEM_CSR_RE.exec(wire)
const body = pem !== null ? pem[1]!.replace(/\s+/g, '') : wire.trim()
return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(body, 'base64'))
}
function toArrayBuffer(bytes: Uint8Array): ArrayBuffer {
return bytes.buffer.slice(bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteOffset + bytes.byteLength) as ArrayBuffer
}
/** Extract the raw 32-byte Ed25519 key from a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER, or null if not Ed25519. */
function rawEd25519FromSpki(spki: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null {
if (spki.length !== ED25519_SPKI_LEN) return null
for (let i = 0; i < ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX.length; i++) {
if (spki[i] !== ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX[i]) return null
}
return spki.subarray(ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX.length)
}
/**
* Verify CSR proof-of-possession: parse the PKCS#10 DER and check its self-signature against the
* embedded public key. Returns the embedded raw Ed25519 pubkey on success. FAIL-CLOSED and uniform:
* malformed DER, a non-Ed25519 key, or a bad signature all yield `{ ok: false, embeddedPub: [] }`
* with no leak of which check failed. Independent of any registry state.
*/
export async function verifyCsrPoP(csr: Uint8Array): Promise<{ ok: boolean; embeddedPub: Uint8Array }> {
const fail = { ok: false, embeddedPub: new Uint8Array(0) }
try {
const req = new x509.Pkcs10CertificateRequest(toArrayBuffer(csr))
const embeddedPub = rawEd25519FromSpki(new Uint8Array(req.publicKey.rawData))
if (embeddedPub === null || embeddedPub.length !== RAW_ED25519_LEN) return fail
const ok = await req.verify()
return ok ? { ok: true, embeddedPub: new Uint8Array(embeddedPub) } : fail
} catch {
return fail
}
}