Files
web-terminal/agent/test/dial.test.ts
Yaojia Wang 5509c81eee fix(tunnel): recover an expired leaf over plain HTTPS, not mTLS
Correction to the previous commit. Its recovery vhost could not work: nginx
will not forward an expired client certificate in ANY `ssl_verify_client` mode.
`optional` answers a bare `400 The SSL certificate error` before any location
runs, and `optional_no_ca` only tolerates CHAIN failures — see nginx's
`ngx_ssl_verify_error_optional()`, which covers self-signed / unknown-issuer /
unverifiable-leaf and NOT `X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`. Verified live against
the deployed :8472 server, which rejected the real expired leaf.

So recovery drops mTLS instead of trying to bend it:

- agent: `buildTlsOptions` and the mTLS renew transport go back to being
  strictly fail-closed on expiry — the relaxation is gone from the TLS layer
  entirely. The rotator now decides per attempt: valid → mTLS `/renew`,
  expired-inside-grace → plain `/recover`, expired-beyond-grace → terminal
  `onExhausted` with no request issued at all.
- new `recoverCert` POSTs `{cert, csr}` with no client certificate. Possession
  of the private key is still proven: the CSR is self-signed by it and the host
  signer already enforces CSR PoP plus `CSR key == registered key`, so a
  replayed (public) cert without the key yields at most a certificate the
  attacker cannot authenticate with.
- control-plane: `/renew` is strict again (grace 0, matching the terminator).
  The grace lives on the new `POST /recover`, which reads the cert from the BODY
  and ignores the `x-client-cert` header, then runs the identical trust
  pipeline: X.509 path validation to the frp-client-CA anchors, SPIFFE parse,
  `notBefore` (never graced), registry `active` + account match. Revocation
  still bites.
- deploy: no new vhost, no new SNI, no DNS. One `location = /recover` merged
  into the existing enroll vhost, documented in
  `deploy/nginx/enroll-recover-location.md` with the nginx source citation.

The load-bearing new test is "a self-signed cert with a FORGED SPIFFE SAN is
refused → 401": nginx no longer validates the chain on this path, so that
assertion is what keeps `/recover` from being a cert vending machine.

Verified: agent 289/289, control-plane 290/290, tsc clean on both.
2026-07-29 09:52:17 +02:00

113 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import type { AgentConfig } from '../src/config/agentConfig.js'
import { generateIdentity } from '../src/keys/identity.js'
import { openKeystore } from '../src/keys/keystore.js'
import {
CertExpiredError,
NotEnrolledError,
buildTlsOptions,
dialRelay,
type RawTlsWs,
type TlsWsConstructor,
} from '../src/transport/dial.js'
const CFG: AgentConfig = {
relayUrl: 'wss://relay.example.com/agent',
enrollUrl: 'https://example.com/enroll',
stateDir: '/tmp/x',
localTargetUrl: 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000',
subdomain: 'host-42',
hostId: 'h-1',
}
function enrolledKs() {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-dial-'))
const ks = openKeystore(dir)
ks.saveIdentity(generateIdentity())
ks.saveCert('CERTPEM', 'CAPEM')
return { dir, ks }
}
const future: () => { validTo: Date } = () => ({ validTo: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000) })
const past: () => { validTo: Date } = () => ({ validTo: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })
describe('buildTlsOptions (T12, INV14/INV4)', () => {
it('wires cert + key + CA and forces rejectUnauthorized true', () => {
const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
const tls = buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: future })
expect(tls.cert).toBe('CERTPEM')
expect(tls.ca).toBe('CAPEM')
expect(tls.key).toContain('PRIVATE KEY') // in-process key PEM
expect(tls.rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true)
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
})
it('carries NO bearer/agent token (mTLS is the auth)', () => {
const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
const tls = buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: future })
expect(JSON.stringify(tls)).not.toMatch(/token|authorization|bearer/i)
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
})
it('missing cert → NotEnrolledError (fail-fast)', () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-dial-'))
expect(() => buildTlsOptions(openKeystore(dir))).toThrow(NotEnrolledError)
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
})
it('expired cert → CertExpiredError', () => {
const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
expect(() => buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: past })).toThrow(CertExpiredError)
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
})
})
describe('dialRelay (T12)', () => {
it('constructs the wss client with the TLS options and resolves on open', async () => {
const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
let capturedUrl = ''
let capturedOpts: unknown
class FakeTlsWs implements RawTlsWs {
constructor(url: string, opts: unknown) {
capturedUrl = url
capturedOpts = opts
queueMicrotask(() => this.openCb?.())
}
private openCb?: () => void
send(): void {}
close(): void {}
on(): void {}
once(ev: string, cb: () => void): void {
if (ev === 'open') this.openCb = cb
}
}
const ws = await dialRelay(CFG, ks, { Ctor: FakeTlsWs as unknown as TlsWsConstructor, certParser: future })
expect(capturedUrl).toBe('wss://relay.example.com/agent')
expect((capturedOpts as { rejectUnauthorized: boolean }).rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true)
expect(ws).toBeDefined()
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
})
it('rejects when the server errors before open (bad chain / MITM)', async () => {
const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
class FakeTlsWs implements RawTlsWs {
private errCb?: (e: unknown) => void
constructor() {
queueMicrotask(() => this.errCb?.(new Error('unable to verify leaf signature')))
}
send(): void {}
close(): void {}
on(): void {}
once(ev: string, cb: (e: unknown) => void): void {
if (ev === 'error') this.errCb = cb
}
}
const p = dialRelay(CFG, ks, { Ctor: FakeTlsWs as unknown as TlsWsConstructor, certParser: future })
await expect(p).rejects.toThrow(/verify/)
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
})
})