Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
118 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { createPublicKey, generateKeyPairSync, verify } from 'node:crypto'
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import { generateIdentity, generateP256Identity } from '../src/keys/identity.js'
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import { KeystoreError, openKeystore } from '../src/keys/keystore.js'
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const dirs: string[] = []
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function freshDir(): string {
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const d = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-ks-'))
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dirs.push(d)
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return d
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}
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afterEach(() => {
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while (dirs.length) rmSync(dirs.pop()!, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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function mode(path: string): number {
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return statSync(path).mode & 0o777
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}
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describe('Keystore (INV4/INV5)', () => {
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it('persists the private key 0600 and reloads it', () => {
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const dir = freshDir()
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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const id = generateIdentity()
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ks.saveIdentity(id)
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expect(mode(join(dir, 'agent.key.pem'))).toBe(0o600)
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const reloaded = ks.loadIdentity()
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expect(reloaded).not.toBeNull()
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expect(Buffer.from(reloaded!.publicKey).equals(Buffer.from(id.publicKey))).toBe(true)
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})
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it('persists cert + CA chain 0600', () => {
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const dir = freshDir()
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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ks.saveCert('CERTPEM', 'CAPEM')
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expect(mode(join(dir, 'agent.cert.pem'))).toBe(0o600)
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expect(mode(join(dir, 'agent.ca.pem'))).toBe(0o600)
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expect(ks.loadCert()).toEqual({ certPem: 'CERTPEM', caChainPem: 'CAPEM' })
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})
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it('FIX 3: round-trips hostContentSecret 0600', () => {
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const dir = freshDir()
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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const secret = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8])
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ks.saveContentSecret(secret)
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expect(mode(join(dir, 'content.secret'))).toBe(0o600)
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expect(Buffer.from(ks.loadContentSecret()!).equals(Buffer.from(secret))).toBe(true)
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})
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it('returns null when nothing is stored yet', () => {
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const ks = openKeystore(freshDir())
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expect(ks.loadIdentity()).toBeNull()
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expect(ks.loadCert()).toBeNull()
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expect(ks.loadContentSecret()).toBeNull()
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})
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it('throws a typed error on a corrupt key file', () => {
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const dir = freshDir()
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'agent.key.pem'), 'not-a-pem')
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expect(() => openKeystore(dir).loadIdentity()).toThrow(KeystoreError)
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})
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it('refuses to write into a group/world-accessible dir (INV5)', () => {
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const dir = join(freshDir(), 'wideopen')
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mkdirSync(dir, { mode: 0o755 })
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expect(() => openKeystore(dir).saveIdentity(generateIdentity())).toThrow(KeystoreError)
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})
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it('keeps the Ed25519 identity byte-identical across save/load (no P-256 regression)', () => {
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const dir = freshDir()
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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const id = generateIdentity()
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ks.saveIdentity(id)
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const reloaded = ks.loadIdentity()
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expect(reloaded!.alg).toBe('ed25519')
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expect(Buffer.from(reloaded!.publicKey).equals(Buffer.from(id.publicKey))).toBe(true)
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expect(reloaded!.enrollFpr).toBe(id.enrollFpr)
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})
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it('FIX H-host-2: round-trips a P-256 frp-client identity (alg + usable signing key)', () => {
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const dir = freshDir()
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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const id = generateP256Identity()
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ks.saveIdentity(id)
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expect(mode(join(dir, 'agent.key.pem'))).toBe(0o600)
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const reloaded = ks.loadIdentity()
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expect(reloaded).not.toBeNull()
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// loadIdentity() branched on the stored key's alg discriminant → P-256, not Ed25519.
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expect(reloaded!.alg).toBe('p256')
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// EC SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER (outer SEQUENCE) preserved exactly.
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expect(reloaded!.publicKey[0]).toBe(0x30)
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expect(Buffer.from(reloaded!.publicKey).equals(Buffer.from(id.publicKey))).toBe(true)
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expect(reloaded!.enrollFpr).toBe(id.enrollFpr)
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// The reloaded key still signs: a DER ECDSA signature that verifies under the original pubkey.
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const msg = new TextEncoder().encode('csr-bytes')
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const sig = reloaded!.sign(msg)
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const pub = createPublicKey({ key: Buffer.from(id.publicKey), format: 'der', type: 'spki' })
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expect(verify('sha256', msg, pub, sig)).toBe(true)
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})
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it('AG1: rejects a stored EC key on a non-P256 curve (e.g. secp384r1) with a clear error', () => {
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const dir = freshDir()
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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// Plant a valid PKCS#8 EC key on the WRONG curve directly at the key path — `ec` alone must not
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// be mistaken for P-256; loadIdentity must assert the named curve and fail closed.
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const { privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'secp384r1' })
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const pem = privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }).toString()
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'agent.key.pem'), pem, { mode: 0o600 })
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expect(() => ks.loadIdentity()).toThrow(KeystoreError)
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expect(() => ks.loadIdentity()).toThrow(/prime256v1|P-256|curve/)
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})
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})
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