Files
web-terminal/relay-contracts/test/capability-pairing.test.ts
Yaojia Wang e7f3bd05f0 feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation
Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.

Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)

Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)

Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install

iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)

Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403

Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 16:11:13 +02:00

129 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import {
CapabilityRightSchema,
CapabilityTokenSchema,
EnrollResultSchema,
NotImplementedInContractsError,
PairingCodeRecordSchema,
verifyCapabilityToken,
} from '../src/index.js'
const UUID = '22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'
const TS = '2026-07-01T00:00:00.000Z'
describe('§4.3 CapabilityToken shape validation', () => {
const valid = {
sub: 'device:1',
aud: 'alice',
host: UUID,
rights: ['attach'],
iat: 1000,
exp: 2000,
jti: 'jti-1',
}
it('accepts a well-formed token body', () => {
expect(CapabilityTokenSchema.parse(valid).rights).toEqual(['attach'])
})
it('rejects empty rights', () => {
expect(CapabilityTokenSchema.safeParse({ ...valid, rights: [] }).success).toBe(false)
})
it('rejects duplicate rights', () => {
expect(
CapabilityTokenSchema.safeParse({ ...valid, rights: ['attach', 'attach'] }).success,
).toBe(false)
})
it('rejects exp <= iat', () => {
expect(CapabilityTokenSchema.safeParse({ ...valid, exp: 1000 }).success).toBe(false)
})
it('rejects an unknown right', () => {
expect(CapabilityTokenSchema.safeParse({ ...valid, rights: ['destroy'] }).success).toBe(false)
})
it('verifyCapabilityToken is a frozen stub (crypto verify owned by P5)', () => {
expect(() => verifyCapabilityToken('raw', 'alice', Date.now())).toThrow(
NotImplementedInContractsError,
)
})
})
describe('CapabilityRight enum — enroll right (FIX C-native-1)', () => {
const validBody = {
sub: 'device:1',
aud: 'alice',
host: UUID,
rights: ['attach'],
iat: 1000,
exp: 2000,
jti: 'jti-1',
}
it('accepts the new enroll right', () => {
expect(CapabilityRightSchema.parse('enroll')).toBe('enroll')
})
it('still accepts the existing rights (backward compatible)', () => {
expect(CapabilityRightSchema.parse('attach')).toBe('attach')
expect(CapabilityRightSchema.parse('manage')).toBe('manage')
expect(CapabilityRightSchema.parse('kill')).toBe('kill')
})
it('still rejects an unknown right', () => {
expect(() => CapabilityRightSchema.parse('destroy')).toThrow()
})
it('accepts a token body carrying the enroll right', () => {
expect(CapabilityTokenSchema.parse({ ...validBody, rights: ['enroll'] }).rights).toEqual([
'enroll',
])
})
})
describe('§4.5 pairing / enroll shapes', () => {
it('accepts a valid EnrollResult', () => {
const rec = {
hostId: UUID,
subdomain: 'alice',
cert: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----',
caChain: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----',
hostContentSecret: new Uint8Array([9, 8, 7]),
}
expect(EnrollResultSchema.parse(rec).hostContentSecret).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array)
})
it('rejects an EnrollResult with a non-bytes hostContentSecret', () => {
expect(
EnrollResultSchema.safeParse({
hostId: UUID,
subdomain: 'a',
cert: 'c',
caChain: 'c',
hostContentSecret: 'not-bytes',
}).success,
).toBe(false)
})
it('accepts a PairingCodeRecord (redeemed and unredeemed)', () => {
expect(
PairingCodeRecordSchema.parse({
codeHash: 'h',
accountId: UUID,
expiresAt: TS,
redeemedAt: null,
}).redeemedAt,
).toBeNull()
expect(
PairingCodeRecordSchema.parse({
codeHash: 'h',
accountId: UUID,
expiresAt: TS,
redeemedAt: TS,
}).redeemedAt,
).toBe(TS)
})
})