2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
28 lines
1.0 KiB
JSON
28 lines
1.0 KiB
JSON
{
|
|
"name": "relay-auth",
|
|
"version": "0.0.0",
|
|
"private": true,
|
|
"type": "module",
|
|
"description": "P5 — Auth & Tenant Isolation for the rendezvous-relay service. Deny-by-default tenant authz (INV1/INV3/INV6), capability tokens + DPoP proof-of-possession (INV15), device-auth proof (§4.4), mTLS/SPIFFE verification + rotation (INV4/INV14), fast revocation (INV12), WebAuthn/TOTP/OIDC/step-up human auth, per-tenant rate-limits, immutable zero-payload audit (INV10). Dependency-light: imports relay-contracts (§4) read-only; no ws/xterm/ANSI parser (INV2/INV11). See docs/PLAN_RELAY_AUTH_ISOLATION.md.",
|
|
"engines": {
|
|
"node": ">=18"
|
|
},
|
|
"main": "src/index.ts",
|
|
"scripts": {
|
|
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
|
|
"test": "vitest run",
|
|
"test:watch": "vitest",
|
|
"test:coverage": "vitest run --coverage"
|
|
},
|
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
"relay-contracts": "file:../relay-contracts",
|
|
"zod": "^3.23.8"
|
|
},
|
|
"devDependencies": {
|
|
"@types/node": "^25.9.3",
|
|
"@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.1.9",
|
|
"typescript": "^6.0.3",
|
|
"vitest": "^4.1.9"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|