Files
web-terminal/relay-contracts/test/e2e-crypto-stubs.test.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

44 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import {
HKDF_INFO,
HKDF_INFO_C2H,
HKDF_INFO_H2C,
NotImplementedInContractsError,
REPLAY_KDF_INFO,
buildClientHandshake,
createE2ESession,
deriveContentKey,
openFrame,
openReplayCiphertext,
sealFrame,
sealReplayFrame,
} from '../src/index.js'
/**
* relay-contracts owns SHAPES only; the crypto implementations live in P4. Each frozen
* signature must exist (importable / type-checked) and throw NotImplementedInContractsError.
*/
describe('§4.4 crypto signatures are frozen stubs (impl in P4)', () => {
const key = {} as never
const env = {} as never
it.each([
['sealFrame', () => sealFrame(key, 0n, new Uint8Array())],
['openFrame', () => openFrame(key, env, 0n)],
['createE2ESession', () => createE2ESession('client', {} as never)],
['buildClientHandshake', () => buildClientHandshake({} as never, 'h', ['aes-256-gcm'])],
['deriveContentKey', () => deriveContentKey({} as never)],
['sealReplayFrame', () => sealReplayFrame(key, 0n, new Uint8Array())],
['openReplayCiphertext', () => openReplayCiphertext(key, new Uint8Array())],
])('%s throws NotImplementedInContractsError', (_name, fn) => {
expect(fn).toThrow(NotImplementedInContractsError)
})
it('exposes the frozen HKDF label constants', () => {
expect(HKDF_INFO).toBe('relay-e2e/v1')
expect(HKDF_INFO_C2H).toBe('relay-e2e/v1/c2h')
expect(HKDF_INFO_H2C).toBe('relay-e2e/v1/h2c')
expect(REPLAY_KDF_INFO).toBe('relay-e2e/replay/v1')
})
})