Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
113 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
113 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import type { AgentConfig } from '../src/config/agentConfig.js'
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import { generateIdentity } from '../src/keys/identity.js'
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import { openKeystore } from '../src/keys/keystore.js'
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import {
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CertExpiredError,
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NotEnrolledError,
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buildTlsOptions,
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dialRelay,
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type RawTlsWs,
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type TlsWsConstructor,
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} from '../src/transport/dial.js'
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const CFG: AgentConfig = {
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relayUrl: 'wss://relay.example.com/agent',
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enrollUrl: 'https://example.com/enroll',
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stateDir: '/tmp/x',
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localTargetUrl: 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000',
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subdomain: 'host-42',
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hostId: 'h-1',
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}
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function enrolledKs() {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-dial-'))
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const ks = openKeystore(dir)
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ks.saveIdentity(generateIdentity())
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ks.saveCert('CERTPEM', 'CAPEM')
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return { dir, ks }
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}
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const future: () => { validTo: Date } = () => ({ validTo: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000) })
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const past: () => { validTo: Date } = () => ({ validTo: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })
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describe('buildTlsOptions (T12, INV14/INV4)', () => {
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it('wires cert + key + CA and forces rejectUnauthorized true', () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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const tls = buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: future })
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expect(tls.cert).toBe('CERTPEM')
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expect(tls.ca).toBe('CAPEM')
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expect(tls.key).toContain('PRIVATE KEY') // in-process key PEM
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expect(tls.rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('carries NO bearer/agent token (mTLS is the auth)', () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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const tls = buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: future })
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expect(JSON.stringify(tls)).not.toMatch(/token|authorization|bearer/i)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('missing cert → NotEnrolledError (fail-fast)', () => {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'wta-dial-'))
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expect(() => buildTlsOptions(openKeystore(dir))).toThrow(NotEnrolledError)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('expired cert → CertExpiredError', () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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expect(() => buildTlsOptions(ks, { certParser: past })).toThrow(CertExpiredError)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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})
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describe('dialRelay (T12)', () => {
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it('constructs the wss client with the TLS options and resolves on open', async () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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let capturedUrl = ''
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let capturedOpts: unknown
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class FakeTlsWs implements RawTlsWs {
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constructor(url: string, opts: unknown) {
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capturedUrl = url
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capturedOpts = opts
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queueMicrotask(() => this.openCb?.())
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}
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private openCb?: () => void
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send(): void {}
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close(): void {}
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on(): void {}
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once(ev: string, cb: () => void): void {
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if (ev === 'open') this.openCb = cb
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}
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}
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const ws = await dialRelay(CFG, ks, { Ctor: FakeTlsWs as unknown as TlsWsConstructor, certParser: future })
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expect(capturedUrl).toBe('wss://relay.example.com/agent')
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expect((capturedOpts as { rejectUnauthorized: boolean }).rejectUnauthorized).toBe(true)
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expect(ws).toBeDefined()
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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it('rejects when the server errors before open (bad chain / MITM)', async () => {
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const { dir, ks } = enrolledKs()
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class FakeTlsWs implements RawTlsWs {
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private errCb?: (e: unknown) => void
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constructor() {
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queueMicrotask(() => this.errCb?.(new Error('unable to verify leaf signature')))
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}
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send(): void {}
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close(): void {}
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on(): void {}
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once(ev: string, cb: (e: unknown) => void): void {
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if (ev === 'error') this.errCb = cb
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}
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}
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const p = dialRelay(CFG, ks, { Ctor: FakeTlsWs as unknown as TlsWsConstructor, certParser: future })
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await expect(p).rejects.toThrow(/verify/)
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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})
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})
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