Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
101 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
101 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
|
import { deriveContentKey, openReplayCiphertext, sealReplayFrame } from 'relay-e2e'
|
|
import { randomBytes } from 'relay-e2e'
|
|
import {
|
|
mountPreviewClient,
|
|
type PreviewDeps,
|
|
type ReadonlyTerminalLike,
|
|
type ReplaySource,
|
|
} from '../src/preview-client'
|
|
|
|
const HOST_SECRET = randomBytes(32)
|
|
const SESSION_ID = 'sess-1'
|
|
const ALG = 'aes-256-gcm' as const
|
|
|
|
/** Seal a screen (as a P2 agent stub would) under K_content with sealReplayFrame. */
|
|
function sealedReplay(lines: readonly string[], secret = HOST_SECRET): ReplaySource {
|
|
const k = deriveContentKey({ hostContentSecret: secret, sessionId: SESSION_ID, alg: ALG })
|
|
const frames = lines.map((line, i) =>
|
|
// sealReplayFrame → E2EEnvelope, encoded to a DATA payload the browser opens.
|
|
// openReplayCiphertext decodes+opens; we mirror the encode via the session envelope codec.
|
|
encodeReplayFrame(sealReplayFrame(k, BigInt(i), new TextEncoder().encode(line))),
|
|
)
|
|
return { sessionId: SESSION_ID, alg: ALG, frames }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The replay codec: relay-e2e's openReplayCiphertext expects the encoded envelope bytes.
|
|
import { encodeEnvelope } from 'relay-e2e'
|
|
function encodeReplayFrame(env: ReturnType<typeof sealReplayFrame>): Uint8Array {
|
|
return encodeEnvelope(env)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const realDeps: PreviewDeps = { deriveContentKey, openReplayCiphertext }
|
|
|
|
function mockTerminal(): ReadonlyTerminalLike & { written: string[] } {
|
|
const written: string[] = []
|
|
return { written, open: () => {}, write: (d) => written.push(d), dispose: () => {} }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
describe('mountPreviewClient (T9)', () => {
|
|
it('recoverable-key decrypt: sealReplayFrame frames render into the read-only xterm (FIX 3)', async () => {
|
|
const card = document.createElement('div')
|
|
const term = mockTerminal()
|
|
const client = mountPreviewClient(
|
|
card,
|
|
sealedReplay(['line-A', 'line-B']),
|
|
HOST_SECRET,
|
|
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
|
|
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => term },
|
|
)
|
|
await client.render()
|
|
expect(term.written).toEqual(['line-A', 'line-B'])
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('wrong/host-mismatched secret → openReplayCiphertext throws → "unavailable", never garbled', async () => {
|
|
const card = document.createElement('div')
|
|
const term = mockTerminal()
|
|
const replay = sealedReplay(['secret-screen']) // sealed under HOST_SECRET
|
|
const client = mountPreviewClient(
|
|
card,
|
|
replay,
|
|
randomBytes(32), // a DIFFERENT host secret → derives a different K_content
|
|
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
|
|
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => term },
|
|
)
|
|
await client.render()
|
|
expect(card.querySelector('.preview-unavailable')?.textContent).toBe('unavailable')
|
|
expect(term.written).toEqual([]) // never wrote a torn screen
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('read-only: the preview terminal exposes NO input path (no onData/send)', async () => {
|
|
const card = document.createElement('div')
|
|
const term = mockTerminal()
|
|
mountPreviewClient(
|
|
card,
|
|
sealedReplay(['x']),
|
|
HOST_SECRET,
|
|
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
|
|
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => term },
|
|
).render()
|
|
expect('onData' in term).toBe(false)
|
|
expect('send' in term).toBe(false)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('never writes hostContentSecret to localStorage/console', async () => {
|
|
const spy = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {})
|
|
const card = document.createElement('div')
|
|
await mountPreviewClient(
|
|
card,
|
|
sealedReplay(['x']),
|
|
HOST_SECRET,
|
|
{ cols: 80, rows: 24 },
|
|
{ ...realDeps, createTerminal: () => mockTerminal() },
|
|
).render()
|
|
expect(spy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
|
expect(JSON.stringify(localStorage)).not.toContain(
|
|
Array.from(HOST_SECRET.slice(0, 4)).join(','),
|
|
)
|
|
spy.mockRestore()
|
|
})
|
|
})
|