Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
110 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
110 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* T11 · Rate-limits / quotas. Two layers (Finding-5):
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* 1. PRE-AUTH throttle keyed on the salted `remoteAddrHash` — the ONLY identifier before a
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* principal exists. Applied in T12 `onUpgrade` BEFORE token verification. Blunts subdomain
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* enumeration, capability-verifier brute-force, and WebAuthn/TOTP guessing DoS.
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* 2. PER-TENANT quotas keyed strictly on the authenticated `accountId` (INV3), never a client id.
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*
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* Pre-auth and per-tenant keys live in DISJOINT namespaces (no bleed). Keys are OPAQUE to the store.
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*/
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import type { PlanTier } from 'relay-contracts'
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import type { RateLimitPolicy, TokenBucketStore } from '../types.js'
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const SECONDS_PER_MINUTE = 60
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const SECONDS_PER_HOUR = 3600
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/** Fixed, plan-independent pre-auth policy (no account known yet). */
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export const PRE_AUTH_POLICY: RateLimitPolicy = {
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connectPerMin: 30,
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enrollPerHour: 10,
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maxConcurrentSessions: 1,
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maxPairedHosts: 1,
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preAuthPerMinPerIp: 60,
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totpMaxFailsPerWindow: 5,
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totpLockoutWindowSec: 300,
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}
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const PLAN_POLICIES: Readonly<Record<PlanTier, RateLimitPolicy>> = {
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free: {
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connectPerMin: 20,
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enrollPerHour: 5,
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maxConcurrentSessions: 2,
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maxPairedHosts: 1,
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preAuthPerMinPerIp: 60,
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totpMaxFailsPerWindow: 5,
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totpLockoutWindowSec: 300,
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},
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personal: {
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connectPerMin: 60,
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enrollPerHour: 20,
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maxConcurrentSessions: 5,
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maxPairedHosts: 5,
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preAuthPerMinPerIp: 60,
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totpMaxFailsPerWindow: 5,
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totpLockoutWindowSec: 300,
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},
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pro: {
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connectPerMin: 120,
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enrollPerHour: 60,
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maxConcurrentSessions: 20,
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maxPairedHosts: 25,
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preAuthPerMinPerIp: 120,
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totpMaxFailsPerWindow: 5,
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totpLockoutWindowSec: 300,
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},
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team: {
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connectPerMin: 300,
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enrollPerHour: 200,
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maxConcurrentSessions: 100,
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maxPairedHosts: 200,
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preAuthPerMinPerIp: 240,
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totpMaxFailsPerWindow: 5,
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totpLockoutWindowSec: 300,
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},
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}
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export function policyForPlan(plan: PlanTier): RateLimitPolicy {
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return PLAN_POLICIES[plan]
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}
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/** PRE-AUTH throttle keyed on `remoteAddrHash`. false = throttled (caller returns 429-equiv). */
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export function checkPreAuthRate(
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remoteAddrHash: string,
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store: TokenBucketStore,
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now: number,
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): Promise<boolean> {
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const perMin = PRE_AUTH_POLICY.preAuthPerMinPerIp
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return store.take(`preauth:ip:${remoteAddrHash}`, perMin / SECONDS_PER_MINUTE, perMin, now)
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}
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/** PER-TENANT connect rate keyed on the authenticated accountId (INV3). */
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export function checkConnectRate(
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accountId: string,
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policy: RateLimitPolicy,
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store: TokenBucketStore,
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now: number,
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): Promise<boolean> {
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const perMin = policy.connectPerMin
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return store.take(`connect:acct:${accountId}`, perMin / SECONDS_PER_MINUTE, perMin, now)
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}
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/** Concurrent-session cap (synchronous; caller supplies the live count). */
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export function checkConcurrentSessions(
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_accountId: string,
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active: number,
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policy: RateLimitPolicy,
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): boolean {
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return active < policy.maxConcurrentSessions
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}
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/** Enrollment rate keyed on the authenticated accountId (INV3). */
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export function checkEnrollRate(
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accountId: string,
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policy: RateLimitPolicy,
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store: TokenBucketStore,
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now: number,
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): Promise<boolean> {
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const perHour = policy.enrollPerHour
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return store.take(`enroll:acct:${accountId}`, perHour / SECONDS_PER_HOUR, perHour, now)
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}
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