2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
57 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
57 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { computeEnrollFpr, resolvePin, verifyPinnedFingerprint } from '../src/fingerprint.js'
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import { MemoryDevicePinStore } from '../src/keystore.js'
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import { hexToBytes } from './helpers.js'
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import fprVector from './vectors/fingerprint.json' with { type: 'json' }
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describe('T4 fingerprint / TOFU pin', () => {
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const pubkey = hexToBytes(fprVector.agentPubkey)
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it('computeEnrollFpr matches the frozen §4.2 enroll_fpr vector (agent↔browser parity)', () => {
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expect(computeEnrollFpr(pubkey)).toBe(fprVector.enrollFpr)
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expect(computeEnrollFpr(pubkey).startsWith('sha256:')).toBe(true)
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})
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it('verifyPinnedFingerprint: true on match, false on any-byte / length diff', () => {
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expect(verifyPinnedFingerprint(pubkey, fprVector.enrollFpr)).toBe(true)
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expect(verifyPinnedFingerprint(pubkey, fprVector.enrollFpr + 'x')).toBe(false)
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expect(verifyPinnedFingerprint(pubkey, 'sha256:zzzz')).toBe(false)
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})
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it('resolvePin: empty store → tofu-first-use with the recomputed fpr', async () => {
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const store = new MemoryDevicePinStore()
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const r = await resolvePin(store, 'h1', pubkey)
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expect(r.outcome).toBe('tofu-first-use')
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expect(r.computedFpr).toBe(fprVector.enrollFpr)
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expect(r.pinnedFpr).toBeNull()
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})
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it('resolvePin: matching pin → match', async () => {
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const store = new MemoryDevicePinStore()
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await store.pin('h1', fprVector.enrollFpr)
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const r = await resolvePin(store, 'h1', pubkey)
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expect(r.outcome).toBe('match')
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})
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it('resolvePin: differing pin → mismatch (MITM/rotation signal), never auto-repins', async () => {
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const store = new MemoryDevicePinStore()
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await store.pin('h1', 'sha256:some-other-host-fpr')
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const r = await resolvePin(store, 'h1', pubkey)
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expect(r.outcome).toBe('mismatch')
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// The stored pin is untouched (no TOFU downgrade).
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expect(await store.get('h1')).toBe('sha256:some-other-host-fpr')
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})
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it('security: decision keys only off the LOCALLY-recomputed fpr, not a caller string', async () => {
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// A different pubkey hashes to a different fpr even if a (hypothetically relay-supplied) pinned
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// string happened to equal the honest host's fpr — resolvePin recomputes from bytes.
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const store = new MemoryDevicePinStore()
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await store.pin('h1', fprVector.enrollFpr)
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const otherPubkey = pubkey.slice()
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otherPubkey[0]! ^= 0xff
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const r = await resolvePin(store, 'h1', otherPubkey)
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expect(r.outcome).toBe('mismatch')
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expect(r.computedFpr).not.toBe(fprVector.enrollFpr)
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})
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})
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