Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
72 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
72 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* T0 (v0.8 MVP) — flat account store + manual provisioning. Deliberately minimal: no
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* immutable-record ceremony (that arrives in CP1/T3-T4, which RETIRE this shim). It exists
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* only to gate the café demo. All INV5 guarantees (hashes-at-rest, constant-time compare,
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* raw-secret-returned-once) are honoured and re-shipped properly in CP1.
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*
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* Backing store is injectable. The default is in-memory; production points it at the
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* `db/flat.sqlite.sql` schema (SQLite) — an integration seam, not exercised in unit tests.
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*/
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import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
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import { hashSecret, verifySecret } from './util/hash.js'
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export interface FlatAccount {
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readonly accountId: string
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readonly subdomain: string
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readonly agentTokenHash: string
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readonly clientTokenHash: string
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}
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export interface FlatBackend {
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insert(row: FlatAccount): Promise<void>
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bySubdomain(subdomain: string): Promise<FlatAccount | null>
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}
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/** In-memory backend (default). SQLite backend is the production swap (see db/flat.sqlite.sql). */
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export function inMemoryFlatBackend(): FlatBackend {
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const rows = new Map<string, FlatAccount>()
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return {
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async insert(row) {
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if (rows.has(row.subdomain)) throw new Error(`subdomain already provisioned: ${row.subdomain}`)
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rows.set(row.subdomain, row)
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},
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async bySubdomain(subdomain) {
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return rows.get(subdomain) ?? null
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},
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}
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}
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export interface FlatStore {
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provisionFlat(subdomain: string): Promise<{ accountId: string; agentToken: string; clientToken: string }>
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lookupBySubdomain(subdomain: string): Promise<FlatAccount | null>
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verifyAgentToken(subdomain: string, raw: string): Promise<boolean>
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}
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const newToken = (): string => randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
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export function createFlatStore(backend: FlatBackend = inMemoryFlatBackend()): FlatStore {
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return {
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async provisionFlat(subdomain) {
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const agentToken = newToken()
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const clientToken = newToken()
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const row: FlatAccount = {
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accountId: randomUUID(),
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subdomain,
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agentTokenHash: hashSecret(agentToken), // hash at rest — raw discarded (INV5)
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clientTokenHash: hashSecret(clientToken),
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}
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await backend.insert(row)
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// Raw tokens returned exactly ONCE at mint time; never persisted.
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return { accountId: row.accountId, agentToken, clientToken }
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},
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async lookupBySubdomain(subdomain) {
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return backend.bySubdomain(subdomain)
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},
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async verifyAgentToken(subdomain, raw) {
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const row = await backend.bySubdomain(subdomain)
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if (row === null) return false
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return verifySecret(raw, row.agentTokenHash) // constant-time compare of hashes
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},
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}
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}
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