Files
web-terminal/control-plane/test/flat-store.test.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

41 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest'
import { createFlatStore, inMemoryFlatBackend } from '../src/flat-store.js'
describe('T0 flat store (v0.8 MVP)', () => {
test('provisionFlat stores hashes only — no raw token at rest (INV5)', async () => {
// Arrange
const backend = inMemoryFlatBackend()
const store = createFlatStore(backend)
// Act
const { agentToken, clientToken } = await store.provisionFlat('alice')
const row = await backend.bySubdomain('alice')
// Assert
expect(row).not.toBeNull()
const serialized = JSON.stringify(row)
expect(serialized).not.toContain(agentToken)
expect(serialized).not.toContain(clientToken)
expect(row?.agentTokenHash.startsWith('scrypt$')).toBe(true)
})
test('verifyAgentToken true for correct token, false for wrong', async () => {
const store = createFlatStore()
const { agentToken } = await store.provisionFlat('bob')
expect(await store.verifyAgentToken('bob', agentToken)).toBe(true)
expect(await store.verifyAgentToken('bob', 'wrong-token')).toBe(false)
})
test('unknown subdomain resolves to null / false', async () => {
const store = createFlatStore()
expect(await store.lookupBySubdomain('nope')).toBeNull()
expect(await store.verifyAgentToken('nope', 'x')).toBe(false)
})
test('two provisions of the same subdomain collide', async () => {
const store = createFlatStore()
await store.provisionFlat('carol')
await expect(store.provisionFlat('carol')).rejects.toThrow(/already provisioned/)
})
})