2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
42 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
42 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Deterministic handshake transcript builder. Both endpoints concatenate the SAME length-prefixed
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* fields in the SAME fixed order (client_hello fields, then host_hello fields EXCLUDING `sig`), so
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* the transcript the host signs is byte-identical to the one the client verifies. `deviceAuthProof`
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* is excluded (it is verified separately and is not part of the signed key-agreement transcript).
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*/
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import type { AeadAlg } from 'relay-contracts'
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import { concatBytes, writeUint32BE } from 'relay-contracts'
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const encoder = new TextEncoder()
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const DOMAIN = encoder.encode('relay-e2e/transcript/v1')
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function lp(chunk: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
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const head = new Uint8Array(4)
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writeUint32BE(head, 0, chunk.length)
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return concatBytes([head, chunk])
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}
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export interface TranscriptParts {
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readonly clientEphPub: Uint8Array
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readonly clientNonce: Uint8Array
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readonly aeadOffer: readonly AeadAlg[]
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readonly hostEphPub: Uint8Array
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readonly hostNonce: Uint8Array
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readonly aeadChoice: AeadAlg
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readonly enrollFpr: string
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}
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/** Build the byte-identical transcript both sides bind the Ed25519 signature to. */
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export function buildTranscript(p: TranscriptParts): Uint8Array {
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return concatBytes([
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lp(DOMAIN),
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lp(p.clientEphPub),
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lp(p.clientNonce),
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lp(encoder.encode(p.aeadOffer.join(','))),
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lp(p.hostEphPub),
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lp(p.hostNonce),
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lp(encoder.encode(p.aeadChoice)),
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lp(encoder.encode(p.enrollFpr)),
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])
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}
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