Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
38 lines
1.3 KiB
TypeScript
38 lines
1.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Shared explicit error types for relay-contracts.
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*
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* `coding-style.md`: "Never silently swallow errors" — every codec throws a typed,
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* descriptive error at the parse boundary instead of returning a partial/ambiguous value.
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*/
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/** Thrown when raw bytes / strings fail to decode into a frozen contract shape. */
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export class ContractDecodeError extends Error {
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constructor(message: string) {
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super(message)
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this.name = 'ContractDecodeError'
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}
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}
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/** Thrown when a value violates a frozen contract invariant before encoding. */
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export class ContractEncodeError extends Error {
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constructor(message: string) {
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super(message)
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this.name = 'ContractEncodeError'
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}
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}
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/**
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* Thrown by crypto-shaped functions whose *implementation* lives in another relay
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* package (P4 `relay-e2e/`, P5 `relay-auth/`). `relay-contracts` owns only the SHAPE
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* (signature + types) per PLAN_RELAY_INDEX §2.1; the runtime is provided downstream.
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*/
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export class NotImplementedInContractsError extends Error {
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constructor(fnName: string, owner: string) {
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super(
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`${fnName} is a frozen SIGNATURE only in relay-contracts; its crypto implementation lives in ${owner}. ` +
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`Import the implementation from that package — do not call it from relay-contracts.`,
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)
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this.name = 'NotImplementedInContractsError'
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}
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}
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