Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
22 lines
973 B
TypeScript
22 lines
973 B
TypeScript
import { describe, test, expect } from 'vitest'
|
|
import { createQuery, type Queryable } from '../src/db/pool.js'
|
|
|
|
describe('T2 parameterized query wrapper (no SQLi path)', () => {
|
|
test('passes params SEPARATELY from SQL text — never interpolated', async () => {
|
|
const calls: { text: string; params: readonly unknown[] }[] = []
|
|
const fake: Queryable = {
|
|
async query(text, params) {
|
|
calls.push({ text, params })
|
|
return { rows: [{ ok: 1 }] }
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
const query = createQuery(fake)
|
|
const rows = await query<{ ok: number }>('SELECT * FROM hosts WHERE host_id = $1', ["'; DROP TABLE hosts; --"])
|
|
expect(rows).toEqual([{ ok: 1 }])
|
|
expect(calls[0]?.text).toBe('SELECT * FROM hosts WHERE host_id = $1')
|
|
// The malicious value stays a bound param — it is NOT concatenated into the SQL text.
|
|
expect(calls[0]?.text).not.toContain('DROP TABLE')
|
|
expect(calls[0]?.params).toEqual(["'; DROP TABLE hosts; --"])
|
|
})
|
|
})
|