2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
44 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
44 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
|
import { ensureAllowedOrigin, subdomainOrigin, type OriginFsDeps } from '../src/service/originConfig.js'
|
|
|
|
function memFs(initial: string | null): { fs: OriginFsDeps; get(): string } {
|
|
const store = { content: initial }
|
|
const fs: OriginFsDeps = {
|
|
exists: () => store.content !== null,
|
|
read: () => store.content ?? '',
|
|
write: (_p, c) => {
|
|
store.content = c
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
return { fs, get: () => store.content ?? '' }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const PATH = '/etc/web-terminal.env'
|
|
|
|
describe('ensureAllowedOrigin (T17, EXPLORE §3)', () => {
|
|
it('composes https://<subdomain>.term.<domain>', () => {
|
|
expect(subdomainOrigin('host-42', 'example.com')).toBe('https://host-42.term.example.com')
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('appends the origin when the file has none', () => {
|
|
const { fs, get } = memFs('PORT=3000\n')
|
|
ensureAllowedOrigin(PATH, 'host-42', 'example.com', fs)
|
|
expect(get()).toContain('ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://host-42.term.example.com')
|
|
expect(get()).toContain('PORT=3000')
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('is idempotent (no duplicate on a second run)', () => {
|
|
const { fs, get } = memFs('ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://host-42.term.example.com\n')
|
|
ensureAllowedOrigin(PATH, 'host-42', 'example.com', fs)
|
|
const matches = get().match(/host-42\.term\.example\.com/g) ?? []
|
|
expect(matches).toHaveLength(1)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('preserves existing origins (never weakens the Origin check)', () => {
|
|
const { fs, get } = memFs('ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://existing.example.com\n')
|
|
ensureAllowedOrigin(PATH, 'host-42', 'example.com', fs)
|
|
expect(get()).toContain('https://existing.example.com')
|
|
expect(get()).toContain('https://host-42.term.example.com')
|
|
})
|
|
})
|