Files
web-terminal/ios/App/WebTerm/DeepLinkRouter.swift
Yaojia Wang 284cfd193a feat(ios,android): P2 wave, git panel, token UX, per-host WS token, docs
App layer, four sequential slices (a shared .xcodeproj means adding files
regenerates it, so these could not run in parallel):

- token UX end to end: pairing prompts for a token when a host 401s, POST /auth
  validates it, and 204-without-Set-Cookie is correctly read as "this server has
  auth disabled" rather than "authenticated". A host paired before the token was
  turned on recovers by re-pairing in place. Remove-host now exists and finally
  gives PushRegistrar.handleHostRemoved a caller.
- project git panel + worktree lifecycle (T-iOS-32) + claude --resume history —
  the parity gap with Android and the web front end.
- terminal search (T-iOS-33) and voice PTT (T-iOS-31) with an epoch guard so a
  session switch between dictation and confirm cannot inject into the wrong
  session.
- theme + Dynamic Type (T-iOS-34) and web ?join= interop (T-iOS-35). RootView no
  longer hard-locks .preferredColorScheme(.dark).

Also unpins SwiftTerm to 1.15.0 by dropping the local hasActiveSelection that
collided with the upstream one, verified green from a fresh derivedDataPath.

Includes the two HIGH fixes the security review found:
- iOS resolved the WS token host-independently, so a token-gated host sitting
  next to an open one could never open a terminal and no on-screen remedy could
  fix it. Now one transport per host; cross-host leakage is structurally
  impossible since both read paths return only that host's own value.
- Android reported the host's own git-credential 401 (git-ops.ts:108, "Push
  authentication required on the host.") as "your access token is wrong", because
  a blanket 401 mapping ran ahead of the per-route one. Git-write routes are now
  ROUTE_DEFINED and keep the server's message.

And the doc sync: README/ios README no longer claim the client is unmerged on
feat/ios-client, the Clients section finally lists Android, and the plan
checkboxes reflect what is actually built.

iOS 534 app tests + 452 package tests; Android 687 tests.
2026-07-30 15:58:01 +02:00

323 lines
14 KiB
Swift

import Foundation
import HostRegistry
import Observation
import OSLog
import WireProtocol
/// T-iOS-22 / T-iOS-35 · Deep-link routing.
///
/// Three external entry points share ONE validation surface:
/// - `webterminal://open?host=<uuid>&join=<uuid>` (scheme registered in
/// project.yml `CFBundleURLTypes`),
/// - **the web share link `http(s)://<host>[:<port>]/?join=<uuid>`**
/// (T-iOS-35 the exact shape `public/share.ts:55` puts in the 🔗 QR, i.e.
/// `${location.origin}/?join=${sessionId}`), and
/// - the WEBTERM_GATE push payload `{sessionId}` (T-iOS-21 reuses
/// `route(from:)` same UUID rules, no second parser).
///
/// (plan T-iOS-22): a deep link is EXTERNAL input. Every field is
/// whitelist-validated (scheme / action / query keys / UUID v4 via the frozen
/// `Validation.isValidSessionId` never re-regexed); ANY invalid part
/// `.ignore` + counter (never crash, never partially apply). The host id
/// resolves ONLY through a `HostStore` lookup (`DeepLinkHandler`) no URL or
/// request is ever built from link contents.
enum DeepLinkRouter {
/// Parse outcome. `.openSession` carries RAW validated ids host
/// EXISTENCE is resolved later against the store (`DeepLinkHandler`).
enum Route: Equatable, Sendable {
/// `webterminal://open` with both ids syntactically valid.
case openSession(hostId: UUID, sessionId: UUID)
/// Web share link (`<origin>/?join=<uuid>`). Carries the NORMALISED
/// origin (`HostEndpoint.originHeader`) instead of a host id the web
/// UI has no idea what UUID this device filed that host under, so
/// resolution is "which paired host serves this origin" (`DeepLinkHandler`).
case joinShared(origin: String, sessionId: UUID)
/// Push payload with a valid `sessionId` (no host id in the payload
/// T-iOS-21's notification handler owns the resolution strategy).
case gateSession(sessionId: UUID)
/// Anything else. Callers count + log; they never partially apply.
case ignore
}
/// Whitelisted URL shape (`webterminal://open`). Scheme and URL host are
/// case-insensitive per RFC 3986 compared lowercased.
private enum LinkShape {
static let scheme = "webterminal"
static let action = "open"
static let emptyPaths: Set<String> = ["", "/"]
}
/// Whitelisted web-share shape (`http(s)://<host>[:<port>]/?join=<uuid>`).
///
/// Deliberately STRICTER than the custom-scheme branch: `webterminal://` can
/// only come from something that knows our private scheme, while an http(s)
/// URL is whatever a QR code or another app decided to hand us. So the query
/// must be EXACTLY one `join` key (no "unknown keys are ignored" leniency
/// here), the path must be empty/`/`, and userinfo/fragment are rejected
/// outright (`http://user:pass@real-host@evil/` is a classic QR phish).
private enum WebShape {
static let schemes: Set<String> = ["http", "https"]
static let queryItemCount = 1
}
/// Whitelisted query keys (exact match; unknown keys are ignored).
private enum QueryKey {
static let host = "host"
static let join = "join"
}
/// Root key of the APNs payload (server contract, T-iOS-20 final shape).
private enum PushKey {
static let sessionId = "sessionId"
}
// MARK: - URL entry (onOpenURL)
static func route(url: URL) -> Route {
guard let components = URLComponents(url: url, resolvingAgainstBaseURL: false),
let scheme = components.scheme?.lowercased(),
// Credentials/fragment are never part of either whitelisted shape.
components.user == nil, components.password == nil,
components.fragment == nil
else { return .ignore }
if scheme == LinkShape.scheme { return customSchemeRoute(components) }
if WebShape.schemes.contains(scheme) { return webShareRoute(url: url, components: components) }
return .ignore
}
/// `webterminal://open?host=<uuid>&join=<uuid>` unchanged semantics
/// (unknown extra query keys stay tolerated; both ids required).
private static func customSchemeRoute(_ components: URLComponents) -> Route {
guard components.host?.lowercased() == LinkShape.action,
LinkShape.emptyPaths.contains(components.path),
let hostId = uniqueValidatedId(in: components, key: QueryKey.host),
let sessionId = uniqueValidatedId(in: components, key: QueryKey.join)
else { return .ignore }
return .openSession(hostId: hostId, sessionId: sessionId)
}
/// `http(s)://<host>[:<port>]/?join=<uuid>` the web 🔗 share QR.
///
/// The origin is derived by `HostEndpoint` (the FROZEN single derivation
/// point, plan §3.1) rather than assembled here: it also does the http(s) +
/// non-empty-host validation and the default-port/lowercasing normalisation
/// the store's own origins were built with, so the comparison in
/// `DeepLinkHandler` is apples to apples.
private static func webShareRoute(url: URL, components: URLComponents) -> Route {
guard LinkShape.emptyPaths.contains(components.path),
let items = components.queryItems, items.count == WebShape.queryItemCount,
let item = items.first, item.name == QueryKey.join,
let raw = item.value, let sessionId = validatedId(raw),
let endpoint = HostEndpoint(baseURL: url)
else { return .ignore }
return .joinShared(origin: endpoint.originHeader, sessionId: sessionId)
}
// MARK: - Push entry (WEBTERM_GATE payload, reused by T-iOS-21)
static func route(from payload: [AnyHashable: Any]) -> Route {
guard let raw = payload[PushKey.sessionId] as? String,
let sessionId = validatedId(raw)
else { return .ignore }
return .gateSession(sessionId: sessionId)
}
// MARK: - Field validation
/// Exactly ONE occurrence of `key`, and its value is a v4 UUID.
/// Duplicates are ambiguous input nil (never partially apply).
private static func uniqueValidatedId(in components: URLComponents, key: String) -> UUID? {
let matches = (components.queryItems ?? []).filter { $0.name == key }
guard matches.count == 1, let raw = matches.first?.value else { return nil }
return validatedId(raw)
}
/// Frozen-contract v4 check (`Validation.isValidSessionId`, plan §3.1)
/// FIRST `UUID(uuidString:)` alone would admit non-v4 ids the server's
/// SESSION_ID_RE rejects.
private static func validatedId(_ raw: String) -> UUID? {
guard Validation.isValidSessionId(raw) else { return nil }
return UUID(uuidString: raw)
}
}
/// User-facing deep-link copy (plan §4: ).
enum DeepLinkCopy {
static let hintTitle = "无法打开链接"
static let unknownHostHint = "链接指向的主机尚未配对,请先扫码完成配对。"
static let hostLoadFailed = "读取已配对主机失败,无法打开链接,请重进 App 后再试。"
static let hintConfirm = ""
}
/// Applies parsed routes to the app: host-store lookup (the ONLY host-id
/// resolution point), the cold-launch stash, the unknown-host pairing hint,
/// and the invalid-link counter. Pure routing stays in `DeepLinkRouter`; this
/// class owns the stateful edges so `AppCoordinator`'s diff stays minimal.
@MainActor
@Observable
final class DeepLinkHandler {
/// Coordinator-provided effects (closures the handler never reaches
/// into navigation state itself).
struct Actions {
/// Open `sessionId` on a RESOLVED, store-known host.
let openSession: @MainActor (HostRegistry.Host, UUID) -> Void
/// Unknown host id surface the pairing flow.
let showPairing: @MainActor () -> Void
}
/// Alert copy for RootView (unknown host / store failure). nil = no alert.
private(set) var hintMessage: String?
/// Invalid deep links dropped so far (plan: `.ignore` + log counter).
private(set) var ignoredCount = 0
@ObservationIgnored private let loadHosts: @Sendable () async throws -> [HostRegistry.Host]
@ObservationIgnored private let actions: Actions
/// Cold-launch gate: `handle(url:)` before `markReady()` stashes instead
/// of applying (the host list / root route may not exist yet).
@ObservationIgnored private var isReady = false
/// Single-slot stash a newer link before readiness replaces the older
/// one (two half-applied navigations would be worse than dropping one).
@ObservationIgnored private var pendingRoute: DeepLinkRouter.Route?
@ObservationIgnored private let logger = Logger(
subsystem: DeepLinkLog.subsystem, category: DeepLinkLog.category
)
init(
loadHosts: @escaping @Sendable () async throws -> [HostRegistry.Host],
actions: Actions
) {
self.loadHosts = loadHosts
self.actions = actions
}
// MARK: - Entry points
/// `.onOpenURL` lands here (via `AppCoordinator.handleDeepLink`). Invalid
/// links are counted and dropped they are NEVER stashed.
func handle(url: URL) async {
let route = DeepLinkRouter.route(url: url)
guard route != .ignore else {
recordIgnored()
return
}
guard isReady else {
pendingRoute = route
return
}
await apply(route)
}
/// Cold-start bootstrap finished (root route decided) flush the stash.
/// Idempotent: the slot is cleared before applying, so a second call
/// never replays.
func markReady() async {
isReady = true
guard let route = pendingRoute else { return }
pendingRoute = nil
await apply(route)
}
func clearHint() {
hintMessage = nil
}
// MARK: - Apply (host id resolves ONLY through the store)
private func apply(_ route: DeepLinkRouter.Route) async {
switch route {
case let .openSession(hostId, sessionId):
// Custom scheme: the link carries OUR host id.
await openSession(sessionId, onHostMatching: { $0.id == hostId })
case let .joinShared(origin, sessionId):
// T-iOS-35 · web share QR: match on the normalised origin. An
// unpaired origin must NEVER be auto-added a QR code is untrusted
// input, so it falls through to the pairing flow (where the user
// sees and confirms the target) exactly like an unknown host id.
await openSession(sessionId, onHostMatching: { $0.endpoint.originHeader == origin })
case .gateSession, .ignore:
// `.gateSession` never reaches here in P1: it only exists for the
// push path, whose handling (host resolution incl.) is T-iOS-21.
return
}
}
/// The ONE host-resolution path (both link shapes funnel through it): store
/// lookup open, or unknown pairing hint. The hint copy is deliberately
/// generic it never echoes the link's origin or session id (a link is
/// untrusted text; quoting it back is a phishing/log-injection surface).
private func openSession(
_ sessionId: UUID, onHostMatching matches: (HostRegistry.Host) -> Bool
) async {
do {
let hosts = try await loadHosts()
guard let host = hosts.first(where: matches) else {
hintMessage = DeepLinkCopy.unknownHostHint
actions.showPairing()
return
}
actions.openSession(host, sessionId)
} catch {
// Explicit failure copy a broken store must never look like a
// silently dead link (plan §4 error-handling rule).
hintMessage = DeepLinkCopy.hostLoadFailed
logger.error("deep link host-store read failed: \(error)")
}
}
private func recordIgnored() {
ignoredCount += 1
// URL contents are untrusted external input log the counter only,
// never echo the link (log-injection / privacy hygiene).
logger.notice("ignored invalid deep link (total: \(self.ignoredCount))")
}
}
private enum DeepLinkLog {
static let subsystem = "com.yaojia.webterm"
static let category = "deep-link"
}
// MARK: - AppCoordinator wiring (kept here so the coordinator diff stays tiny)
extension AppCoordinator {
/// Factory for the coordinator's lazy `deepLink` property.
func makeDeepLinkHandler() -> DeepLinkHandler {
DeepLinkHandler(
loadHosts: { [environment] in try await environment.hostStore.loadAll() },
actions: DeepLinkHandler.Actions(
openSession: { [weak self] host, sessionId in
self?.openDeepLinkedSession(host: host, sessionId: sessionId)
},
showPairing: { [weak self] in
self?.showPairingForDeepLink()
}
)
)
}
/// RootView's `.onOpenURL` entry (sync SwiftUI context async apply).
/// Fires for BOTH warm links and cold launches on cold start the
/// handler stashes until `bootstrap()` calls `markReady()`.
func handleDeepLink(url: URL) {
Task { await deepLink.handle(url: url) }
}
/// Deep links may target a session while another terminal is open:
/// detach the current one first (`open` is a no-op otherwise its
/// one-foreground-session guard would swallow the link).
private func openDeepLinkedSession(host: HostRegistry.Host, sessionId: UUID) {
if terminalController != nil {
closeTerminal()
}
open(SessionListViewModel.OpenRequest(id: UUID(), host: host, sessionId: sessionId))
}
/// Unknown host id pairing. On the first-run pairing route the pairing
/// screen is already frontmost only the list route needs the sheet.
private func showPairingForDeepLink() {
guard route == .sessions else { return }
presentAddHost()
}
}