Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
124 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript
124 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import { X509Certificate, createPublicKey, verify } from 'node:crypto'
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import { generateIdentity, generateP256Identity } from '../src/keys/identity.js'
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import { buildCsr } from '../src/enroll/csr.js'
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// --- minimal DER reader (test-only) — walks the PKCS#10 outer SEQUENCE into its 3 children -------
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interface Tlv {
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readonly tag: number
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/** the full tag+length+value bytes (what was signed, for the CertificationRequestInfo). */
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readonly tlv: Uint8Array
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readonly content: Uint8Array
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}
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function readTlv(buf: Uint8Array, off: number): { node: Tlv; next: number } {
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const tag = buf[off]!
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let i = off + 1
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const first = buf[i]!
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let len: number
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if (first < 0x80) {
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len = first
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i += 1
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} else {
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const n = first & 0x7f
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len = 0
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for (let k = 0; k < n; k++) len = (len << 8) | buf[i + 1 + k]!
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i += 1 + n
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}
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return { node: { tag, tlv: buf.subarray(off, i + len), content: buf.subarray(i, i + len) }, next: i + len }
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}
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function pemToDer(pem: string): Uint8Array {
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const b64 = pem.replace(/-----[A-Z ]+-----/g, '').replace(/\s+/g, '')
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return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(b64, 'base64'))
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}
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/** The three children of the PKCS#10 outer SEQUENCE: [certificationRequestInfo, sigAlg, signature]. */
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function csrChildren(pem: string): readonly Tlv[] {
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const der = pemToDer(pem)
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const outer = readTlv(der, 0).node
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const children: Tlv[] = []
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let p = 0
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while (p < outer.content.length) {
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const { node, next } = readTlv(outer.content, p)
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children.push(node)
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p = next
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}
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return children
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}
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describe('PKCS#10 CSR (T4)', () => {
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it('emits a PEM CERTIFICATE REQUEST', () => {
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const csr = buildCsr(generateIdentity(), 'host-42.term.example.com')
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expect(csr).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----')
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expect(csr).toContain('-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----')
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})
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it('does not contain private-key material (INV4)', () => {
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const id = generateIdentity()
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const csr = buildCsr(id, 'host-42')
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expect(csr).not.toContain('PRIVATE KEY')
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expect(csr).not.toContain(id.exportPrivatePkcs8Pem().split('\n')[1]!)
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})
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it('produces a syntactically decodable DER structure', () => {
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// Node can't parse a CSR directly, but the base64 body must be valid DER (a SEQUENCE).
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const csr = buildCsr(generateIdentity(), 'host-42')
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const b64 = csr
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.replace(/-----[A-Z ]+-----/g, '')
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.replace(/\s+/g, '')
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const der = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64')
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expect(der[0]).toBe(0x30) // outer SEQUENCE tag
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expect(der.length).toBeGreaterThan(64)
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// sanity: X509Certificate exists (crypto available) — unrelated smoke to keep import used
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expect(typeof X509Certificate).toBe('function')
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})
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})
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describe('P-256 PKCS#10 CSR (FIX H-host-2)', () => {
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it('emits a PEM CERTIFICATE REQUEST for a P-256 identity', () => {
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const csr = buildCsr(generateP256Identity(), 'alice.terminal.yaojia.wang')
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expect(csr).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----')
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expect(csr).toContain('-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----')
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expect(csr).not.toContain('PRIVATE KEY')
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})
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it('round-trips as a valid PKCS#10: signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256', () => {
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const csr = buildCsr(generateP256Identity(), 'alice.terminal.yaojia.wang')
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const [, sigAlg] = csrChildren(csr)
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// sigAlg = SEQUENCE { OID 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 } (no parameters, RFC 5758 §3.2)
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const oidTlv = readTlv(sigAlg!.content, 0).node
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expect(Array.from(oidTlv.content)).toEqual([0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02])
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// no parameters: the sigAlg SEQUENCE holds ONLY the OID.
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expect(oidTlv.tlv.length).toBe(sigAlg!.content.length)
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})
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it('self-signature verifies over the CertificationRequestInfo (verifyCsrPoPEc semantics)', () => {
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const id = generateP256Identity()
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const csr = buildCsr(id, 'alice.terminal.yaojia.wang')
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const [reqInfo, , sigVal] = csrChildren(csr)
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// signatureValue BIT STRING content = 0x00 (unused bits) || DER ECDSA-Sig-Value.
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expect(sigVal!.tag).toBe(0x03)
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const signature = sigVal!.content.subarray(1)
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const pub = createPublicKey({ key: Buffer.from(id.publicKey), format: 'der', type: 'spki' })
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// Verify over the EXACT CertificationRequestInfo bytes that buildCsr signed.
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expect(verify('sha256', reqInfo!.tlv, pub, signature)).toBe(true)
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// Tampering with the signed body breaks PoP.
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const tampered = Uint8Array.from(reqInfo!.tlv)
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tampered[tampered.length - 1] = tampered[tampered.length - 1]! ^ 0xff
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expect(verify('sha256', tampered, pub, signature)).toBe(false)
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})
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it('embeds the identity EC SPKI verbatim as the CSR subjectPublicKeyInfo', () => {
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const id = generateP256Identity()
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const csr = buildCsr(id, 'alice.terminal.yaojia.wang')
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const [reqInfo] = csrChildren(csr)
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// requestInfo = SEQUENCE { version, name, spki, [0] attributes }; the spki is the 3rd child.
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const inner = reqInfo!.content
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const version = readTlv(inner, 0)
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const name = readTlv(inner, version.next)
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const spki = readTlv(inner, name.next).node
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expect(Buffer.from(spki.tlv).equals(Buffer.from(id.publicKey))).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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