2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
73 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
73 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* T2 — the frozen CLIENT-contract surface. Re-exports the `relay-contracts` §4.2/§4.3 shapes
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* VERBATIM (never redefines them) and adds ONLY response envelopes needed to parse HTTP JSON.
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*
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* INV3: there is NO `account_id`/`tenant_id` REQUEST field anywhere here — identity is always the
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* cookie/passkey session the browser already holds; the server derives the account.
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*
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* Wire note: over JSON, `HostRecord.agentPubkey` arrives base64url-encoded (a Uint8Array cannot
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* ride JSON). The wire schema decodes it back to `Uint8Array` so callers receive a genuine
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* `HostRecord` — validate-at-boundary (coding-style.md "Input Validation").
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*/
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import {
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HostStatusSchema,
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decodeBase64UrlBytes,
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type HostRecord,
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type HostStatus,
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type CapabilityRight,
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} from 'relay-contracts'
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// Re-export the frozen types verbatim so P6 modules import them from one place (the src/types.ts
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// discipline: a new shared field is changed in relay-contracts, never redeclared locally).
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export type { HostRecord, HostStatus, CapabilityRight }
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export { HostStatusSchema }
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/** Wire form of a HostRecord: `agentPubkey` is base64url text, decoded to bytes on parse. */
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export const HostRecordWireSchema = z
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.object({
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hostId: z.string().uuid(),
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accountId: z.string().uuid(),
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subdomain: z.string().min(1),
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agentPubkey: z.string().min(1),
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enrollFpr: z.string().min(1),
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status: HostStatusSchema,
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lastSeen: z.string().min(1),
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createdAt: z.string().min(1),
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revokedAt: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
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})
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.strict()
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.transform(
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(w): HostRecord => ({
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hostId: w.hostId,
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accountId: w.accountId,
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subdomain: w.subdomain,
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// Copy into a fresh ArrayBuffer-backed Uint8Array so the type matches HostRecord exactly.
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agentPubkey: new Uint8Array(decodeBase64UrlBytes(w.agentPubkey)),
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enrollFpr: w.enrollFpr,
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status: w.status,
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lastSeen: w.lastSeen,
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createdAt: w.createdAt,
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revokedAt: w.revokedAt,
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}),
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)
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/** `GET /api/hosts` → array of HostRecord. */
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export const HostListWireSchema = z.array(HostRecordWireSchema).readonly()
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/** `GET /api/hosts/:id/status` → the host's current status. */
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export const HostStatusResponseSchema = z.object({ status: HostStatusSchema }).strict()
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/** `POST /api/pairing-codes` → single-use short-TTL code + its expiry (§4.5 ISSUE). */
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export const PairingCodeResponseSchema = z
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.object({
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code: z.string().min(1),
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expiresAt: z.string().min(1),
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})
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.strict()
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.readonly()
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export type PairingCodeResponse = z.infer<typeof PairingCodeResponseSchema>
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/** `POST /api/hosts/:id/capability-token` → opaque raw §4.3 token (v0.9+; never decoded to trust). */
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export const CapabilityTokenResponseSchema = z.object({ token: z.string().min(1) }).strict()
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