Files
web-terminal/relay-web/test/config.test.ts
Yaojia Wang 2af57e6686 feat(relay): rendezvous-relay service — 7 packages + plans (contracts/transport/agent/control-plane/e2e/auth/web)
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.

Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
  capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay:   native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent:        host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e:    browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth:   Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web:    browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering

Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.

NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
2026-07-02 06:10:16 +02:00

40 lines
1.8 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import { readConfig } from '../src/config'
import { ConfigError } from '../src/errors'
/** Build a Location-like object from a URL string. */
function loc(url: string): Pick<Location, 'protocol' | 'host' | 'hostname'> {
const u = new URL(url)
return { protocol: u.protocol, host: u.host, hostname: u.hostname }
}
describe('readConfig — subdomain + scheme-following same-origin URL (T1, M6)', () => {
it('derives subdomain and wss: URL on https', () => {
const cfg = readConfig(loc('https://alice.term.example.com'))
expect(cfg.subdomain).toBe('alice')
expect(cfg.wsUrl('/term')).toBe('wss://alice.term.example.com/term')
expect(cfg.apiBase).toBe('')
})
it('follows the page scheme to ws: on http (no mixed-content on TLS)', () => {
const cfg = readConfig(loc('http://alice.term.localhost:3000'))
expect(cfg.subdomain).toBe('alice')
expect(cfg.wsUrl('/term')).toBe('ws://alice.term.localhost:3000/term')
})
it('throws ConfigError on a bare host with no subdomain label (fail-fast, never defaults)', () => {
expect(() => readConfig(loc('https://example.com'))).toThrow(ConfigError)
expect(() => readConfig(loc('https://localhost'))).toThrow(ConfigError)
expect(() => readConfig(loc('https://term.example.com'))).toThrow(ConfigError)
})
it('keeps wsUrl same-origin — a path cannot inject a foreign host', () => {
const cfg = readConfig(loc('https://alice.term.example.com'))
const injected = cfg.wsUrl('//evil.com')
expect(injected.startsWith('wss://alice.term.example.com/')).toBe(true)
expect(injected).not.toContain('evil.com/')
// even a scheme-looking path stays anchored to our host
expect(new URL(cfg.wsUrl('/x')).host).toBe('alice.term.example.com')
})
})