Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
91 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
91 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Agent configuration — PLAN_RELAY_AGENT T2. Zod-validated at the startup boundary (INV9):
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* - relayUrl MUST be wss:// (encrypted tunnel only)
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* - enrollUrl MUST be https:// (enrollment over TLS only)
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* - localTargetUrl MUST be ws:// to a LOOPBACK host (anti-SSRF: the agent forwards ONLY to
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* the local web-terminal, never an arbitrary target).
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* Fail-fast on missing/invalid values — never silently default a security-relevant field.
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*/
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import { homedir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import { isLoopbackHostLiteral } from '../net/loopbackLiteral.js'
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export interface AgentConfig {
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readonly relayUrl: string
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readonly enrollUrl: string
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readonly stateDir: string
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readonly localTargetUrl: string
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readonly subdomain: string | null
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readonly hostId: string | null
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}
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/**
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* True iff `url` is ws:// to a loopback host (a well-formed 127.0.0.0/8 IPv4 literal, localhost, or
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* ::1). Uses the shared strict check so a crafted suffixed hostname such as
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* `ws://127.0.0.1.attacker.example.com:3000` — which the outbound dial would DNS-resolve and connect
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* to wherever it points — is REJECTED, closing the anti-SSRF bypass (not merely `startsWith('127.')`).
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*/
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export function isLoopbackWsUrl(url: string): boolean {
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let parsed: URL
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try {
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parsed = new URL(url)
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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if (parsed.protocol !== 'ws:') return false
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return isLoopbackHostLiteral(parsed.hostname)
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}
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function hasScheme(url: string, scheme: string): boolean {
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try {
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return new URL(url).protocol === scheme
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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}
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export const AgentConfigSchema = z
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.object({
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relayUrl: z
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.string()
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.refine((u) => hasScheme(u, 'wss:'), 'relayUrl must be a wss:// URL'),
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enrollUrl: z
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.string()
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.refine((u) => hasScheme(u, 'https:'), 'enrollUrl must be an https:// URL'),
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stateDir: z.string().min(1),
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localTargetUrl: z
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.string()
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.refine(isLoopbackWsUrl, 'localTargetUrl must be a ws:// loopback URL (anti-SSRF)'),
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subdomain: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
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hostId: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
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})
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.strict()
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.readonly()
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const DEFAULT_LOCAL_TARGET = 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000'
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/** Default state dir where key/cert/content-secret live (~/.web-terminal-agent). */
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export function defaultStateDir(): string {
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return join(homedir(), '.web-terminal-agent')
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}
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/**
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* Build + validate an AgentConfig from env + explicit argv overrides (argv wins). Throws a
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* ZodError (fail-fast) if any required field is missing or fails a scheme/loopback refinement.
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*/
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export function loadAgentConfig(
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env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
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argv: Partial<AgentConfig> = {},
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): AgentConfig {
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const merged = {
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relayUrl: argv.relayUrl ?? env.RELAY_URL,
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enrollUrl: argv.enrollUrl ?? env.ENROLL_URL,
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stateDir: argv.stateDir ?? env.STATE_DIR ?? defaultStateDir(),
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localTargetUrl: argv.localTargetUrl ?? env.LOCAL_TARGET_URL ?? DEFAULT_LOCAL_TARGET,
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subdomain: argv.subdomain ?? env.SUBDOMAIN ?? null,
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hostId: argv.hostId ?? env.HOST_ID ?? null,
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}
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return AgentConfigSchema.parse(merged)
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}
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