Files
web-terminal/agent/src/config/agentConfig.ts
Yaojia Wang e7f3bd05f0 feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation
Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.

Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)

Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)

Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install

iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)

Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403

Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 16:11:13 +02:00

91 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Agent configuration — PLAN_RELAY_AGENT T2. Zod-validated at the startup boundary (INV9):
* - relayUrl MUST be wss:// (encrypted tunnel only)
* - enrollUrl MUST be https:// (enrollment over TLS only)
* - localTargetUrl MUST be ws:// to a LOOPBACK host (anti-SSRF: the agent forwards ONLY to
* the local web-terminal, never an arbitrary target).
* Fail-fast on missing/invalid values — never silently default a security-relevant field.
*/
import { homedir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { z } from 'zod'
import { isLoopbackHostLiteral } from '../net/loopbackLiteral.js'
export interface AgentConfig {
readonly relayUrl: string
readonly enrollUrl: string
readonly stateDir: string
readonly localTargetUrl: string
readonly subdomain: string | null
readonly hostId: string | null
}
/**
* True iff `url` is ws:// to a loopback host (a well-formed 127.0.0.0/8 IPv4 literal, localhost, or
* ::1). Uses the shared strict check so a crafted suffixed hostname such as
* `ws://127.0.0.1.attacker.example.com:3000` — which the outbound dial would DNS-resolve and connect
* to wherever it points — is REJECTED, closing the anti-SSRF bypass (not merely `startsWith('127.')`).
*/
export function isLoopbackWsUrl(url: string): boolean {
let parsed: URL
try {
parsed = new URL(url)
} catch {
return false
}
if (parsed.protocol !== 'ws:') return false
return isLoopbackHostLiteral(parsed.hostname)
}
function hasScheme(url: string, scheme: string): boolean {
try {
return new URL(url).protocol === scheme
} catch {
return false
}
}
export const AgentConfigSchema = z
.object({
relayUrl: z
.string()
.refine((u) => hasScheme(u, 'wss:'), 'relayUrl must be a wss:// URL'),
enrollUrl: z
.string()
.refine((u) => hasScheme(u, 'https:'), 'enrollUrl must be an https:// URL'),
stateDir: z.string().min(1),
localTargetUrl: z
.string()
.refine(isLoopbackWsUrl, 'localTargetUrl must be a ws:// loopback URL (anti-SSRF)'),
subdomain: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
hostId: z.string().min(1).nullable(),
})
.strict()
.readonly()
const DEFAULT_LOCAL_TARGET = 'ws://127.0.0.1:3000'
/** Default state dir where key/cert/content-secret live (~/.web-terminal-agent). */
export function defaultStateDir(): string {
return join(homedir(), '.web-terminal-agent')
}
/**
* Build + validate an AgentConfig from env + explicit argv overrides (argv wins). Throws a
* ZodError (fail-fast) if any required field is missing or fails a scheme/loopback refinement.
*/
export function loadAgentConfig(
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
argv: Partial<AgentConfig> = {},
): AgentConfig {
const merged = {
relayUrl: argv.relayUrl ?? env.RELAY_URL,
enrollUrl: argv.enrollUrl ?? env.ENROLL_URL,
stateDir: argv.stateDir ?? env.STATE_DIR ?? defaultStateDir(),
localTargetUrl: argv.localTargetUrl ?? env.LOCAL_TARGET_URL ?? DEFAULT_LOCAL_TARGET,
subdomain: argv.subdomain ?? env.SUBDOMAIN ?? null,
hostId: argv.hostId ?? env.HOST_ID ?? null,
}
return AgentConfigSchema.parse(merged)
}