Files
web-terminal/agent/src/keys/keystore.ts
Yaojia Wang e7f3bd05f0 feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation
Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.

Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)

Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)

Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install

iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)

Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403

Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 16:11:13 +02:00

137 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* On-disk keystore — PLAN_RELAY_AGENT T3 (INV4/INV5). Persists ONLY to `stateDir`, every secret
* file mode `0600`. Stores: the Ed25519 private key (PKCS#8 PEM), the mTLS cert + CA chain, and
* the FIX 3 unwrapped `hostContentSecret`. The raw pairing code is NEVER written here (T4).
*/
import {
chmodSync,
existsSync,
mkdirSync,
readFileSync,
statSync,
writeFileSync,
} from 'node:fs'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { createPrivateKey } from 'node:crypto'
import type { AgentIdentity } from './identity.js'
import { identityFromPrivatePem, p256IdentityFromPrivatePem } from './identity.js'
const SECRET_MODE = 0o600
const DIR_MODE = 0o700
export interface Keystore {
saveIdentity(id: AgentIdentity): void
loadIdentity(): AgentIdentity | null
saveCert(certPem: string, caChainPem: string): void
loadCert(): { certPem: string; caChainPem: string } | null
saveContentSecret(secret: Uint8Array): void
loadContentSecret(): Uint8Array | null
}
const KEY_FILE = 'agent.key.pem'
const CERT_FILE = 'agent.cert.pem'
const CA_FILE = 'agent.ca.pem'
const CONTENT_SECRET_FILE = 'content.secret'
/** Corrupt/unreadable key material surfaces as a typed error (never a silent empty read). */
export class KeystoreError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message)
this.name = 'KeystoreError'
}
}
function ensureDir(stateDir: string): void {
if (!existsSync(stateDir)) {
mkdirSync(stateDir, { recursive: true, mode: DIR_MODE })
return
}
// Refuse to write secrets into a world-/group-accessible directory (INV5 hard error).
const mode = statSync(stateDir).mode & 0o777
if ((mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
throw new KeystoreError(
`stateDir ${stateDir} is group/world accessible (mode ${mode.toString(8)}); refusing to write secrets`,
)
}
}
/**
* Reconstruct an `AgentIdentity` from a stored PKCS#8 PEM, branching on the key's algorithm
* discriminant (the PKCS#8 AlgorithmIdentifier OID, surfaced as `asymmetricKeyType`): an Ed25519
* key → the relay-path builder; an EC P-256 key → the native frp-client builder (EC SPKI publicKey).
* A saved P-256 identity therefore round-trips as `alg: 'p256'` with a usable signing key, while
* Ed25519 stays byte-identical. Any other algorithm is a hard error (never silently mislabeled).
*/
function identityFromStoredPem(pem: string): AgentIdentity {
const key = createPrivateKey(pem)
const alg = key.asymmetricKeyType
if (alg === 'ed25519') return identityFromPrivatePem(pem)
if (alg === 'ec') {
// An `ec` key alone is not proof of P-256 — a P-384/secp256k1 key also reports `ec`. The native
// frp-client path is P-256 ONLY, so assert the named curve before treating it as such; any other
// curve is a hard error (never silently mislabeled as a usable P-256 identity).
const curve = key.asymmetricKeyDetails?.namedCurve
if (curve !== 'prime256v1') {
throw new Error(
`unsupported stored EC identity curve: ${curve ?? 'unknown'} (only prime256v1/P-256 is supported)`,
)
}
return p256IdentityFromPrivatePem(pem)
}
throw new Error(`unsupported stored identity key algorithm: ${alg ?? 'unknown'}`)
}
function writeSecret(path: string, data: string | Uint8Array): void {
writeFileSync(path, data, { mode: SECRET_MODE })
// Enforce 0600 even if a prior umask/file left it wider.
chmodSync(path, SECRET_MODE)
}
export function openKeystore(stateDir: string): Keystore {
const keyPath = join(stateDir, KEY_FILE)
const certPath = join(stateDir, CERT_FILE)
const caPath = join(stateDir, CA_FILE)
const secretPath = join(stateDir, CONTENT_SECRET_FILE)
return {
saveIdentity(id: AgentIdentity): void {
ensureDir(stateDir)
writeSecret(keyPath, id.exportPrivatePkcs8Pem())
},
loadIdentity(): AgentIdentity | null {
if (!existsSync(keyPath)) return null
let pem: string
try {
pem = readFileSync(keyPath, 'utf8')
} catch (err) {
throw new KeystoreError(`failed to read identity key: ${(err as Error).message}`)
}
try {
return identityFromStoredPem(pem)
} catch (err) {
throw new KeystoreError(`corrupt identity key file: ${(err as Error).message}`)
}
},
saveCert(certPem: string, caChainPem: string): void {
ensureDir(stateDir)
writeSecret(certPath, certPem)
writeSecret(caPath, caChainPem)
},
loadCert(): { certPem: string; caChainPem: string } | null {
if (!existsSync(certPath) || !existsSync(caPath)) return null
return {
certPem: readFileSync(certPath, 'utf8'),
caChainPem: readFileSync(caPath, 'utf8'),
}
},
saveContentSecret(secret: Uint8Array): void {
ensureDir(stateDir)
writeSecret(secretPath, secret)
},
loadContentSecret(): Uint8Array | null {
if (!existsSync(secretPath)) return null
return new Uint8Array(readFileSync(secretPath))
},
}
}