2af57e6686
Multi-tenant reverse-tunnel service ("ngrok for Claude Code" with E2E): a
host-agent dials OUT to an operator-run relay; external devices reach the host
THROUGH the relay, routed by per-tenant subdomain, forwarding ciphertext only
(the relay never sees plaintext). Lets a customer reach their own self-hosted
web-terminal from anywhere with zero networking setup.
Packages — all tsc-strict + vitest green (656 tests), cross-package integration verified:
- relay-contracts: frozen shared contracts (mux frame codec, data model,
capability token, E2E envelope, pairing) — the src/types.ts analog
- term-relay: native WS mux + stateless data plane (subdomain routing, ciphertext forward)
- agent: host-agent (pairing, per-host Ed25519 + mTLS dial-out, forwards to 127.0.0.1:3000)
- control-plane: accounts/hosts registry, pairing-code flow, routing table, provisioning
- relay-e2e: browser<->agent E2E (X25519 ECDH through relay, AEAD, anti-replay, recoverable replay key)
- relay-auth: Passkey/WebAuthn, capability tokens, per-host certs, deny-by-default tenant isolation
- relay-web: browser login + Web Crypto E2E + client-side preview rendering
Security invariants INV1-15 enforced; cross-tenant isolation CI tripwire live
(.github/workflows/relay-tripwire.yml). Design + implementation-level plans in
docs/PLAN_RELAY_*.md and docs/EXPLORE_RELAY_SERVICE.md.
NOTE: generated autonomously per the reviewed plans. The security-critical
packages (relay-e2e, relay-auth) REQUIRE expert security audit before any real
deployment — passing tests prove self-consistency, not resistance to attackers.
Base app (src/, public/) unchanged; concurrent desktop work left uncommitted.
27 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
27 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
# T12 · frp server (frps) — v0.8 MVP transport stepping-stone.
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#
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# Single-node frps on the VPS with WILDCARD vhost so `*.term.<domain>` routes by subdomain to
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# each agent's proxy (EXPLORE §5.4). Contract-compatible with the native §4.1 mux so the v0.9 swap
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# reshapes nothing (frp subdomain vhost → T7 router; frp login plugin → T8 gate; yamux → §4.1 mux).
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#
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# TLS: terminate here OR at Cloudflare in front (M6 scheme-following preserved end-to-end). Values
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# below reference environment via your process manager; DO NOT commit real secrets (INV5/INV9).
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bindPort = 7000 # agent (frpc) control connection
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# Wildcard subdomain vhost — the tenant routing substrate.
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vhostHTTPSPort = 443 # browser-facing wss:// (or set vhostHTTPPort behind Cloudflare TLS)
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subdomainHost = "term.example.com" # = BASE_DOMAIN; *.term.example.com routes by leftmost label
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# Deny-by-default auth at the edge (the auth the base app never had, EXPLORE §5.5).
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# The server-plugin delegates EVERY Login/NewProxy/NewUserConn decision to P3's control plane
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# via plugin-hook.ts — no tenancy logic lives in frps (v0.8 shared-token gate is a KNOWN,
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# temporary shortcut, replaced by capability tokens + mTLS in v0.9).
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[[httpPlugins]]
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name = "control-plane-authz"
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addr = "127.0.0.1:9001" # plugin-hook.ts HTTP shim → P3 authz endpoint
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path = "/handler"
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ops = ["Login", "NewProxy", "NewUserConn"]
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# Opaque forwarding only — frps forwards TCP/WS streams and parses NO terminal bytes (INV11).
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