Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12, no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md. Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/): - ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256) - ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing - ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers - ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert) - registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit - auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify - api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default) - pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm - boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast) Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind) Host agent (agent/): - transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract) - keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE - net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient + Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap) Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403 Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85, iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy, VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
189 lines
7.4 KiB
Swift
189 lines
7.4 KiB
Swift
import Foundation
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import Security
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import Testing
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@testable import ClientTLS
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// C-iOS · Proves the manual PKCS#10 encoder produces a well-formed, self-signed
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// P-256 CSR that the control-plane `verifyCsrPoPEc` (id-ecPublicKey + prime256v1
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// SPKI, ecdsa-with-SHA256 self-signature) would accept. Runs headless with a
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// SOFTWARE P-256 SecKey (SecKeyCreateRandomKey WITHOUT the Secure-Enclave token)
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// so no hardware/entitlement is needed — the signing path is byte-identical to
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// the on-device SE key. Real SE keygen + SecIdentity roundtrip are device-only.
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/// Software P-256 key via the SAME SecKey API used on-device (no SE token).
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private func makeSoftwareKey() throws -> SecureEnclaveKey {
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try SecureEnclaveKeyFactory.generateSoftware(tag: nil, permanent: false)
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}
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@Test("CSR is a canonical PKCS#10 SEQUENCE of exactly three elements")
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func csrOuterStructure() throws {
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// Arrange
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let signer = try makeSoftwareKey()
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// Act
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let der = try CertificateSigningRequest.der(
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subjectCommonName: "web-terminal-device", signer: signer
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)
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// Assert — outer CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { info, algId, sig }.
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let bytes = [UInt8](der)
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let outer = try #require(TestDER.read(bytes, at: 0))
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#expect(outer.tag == 0x30)
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#expect(outer.end == bytes.count) // no trailing garbage
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let parts = TestDER.children(bytes, outer)
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#expect(parts.count == 3)
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#expect(parts[0].tag == 0x30) // certificationRequestInfo
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#expect(parts[1].tag == 0x30) // signatureAlgorithm
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#expect(parts[2].tag == 0x03) // signature BIT STRING
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}
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@Test("CSR self-signature verifies against the embedded P-256 public key")
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func csrSelfSignatureVerifies() throws {
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// Arrange
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let signer = try makeSoftwareKey()
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let expectedPoint = try signer.publicKeyX963()
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// Act
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let der = try CertificateSigningRequest.der(
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subjectCommonName: "web-terminal-device", signer: signer
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)
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let bytes = [UInt8](der)
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// Extract the exact CertificationRequestInfo bytes that were signed and the
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// ECDSA signature (the same crypto check `verifyCsrPoPEc`'s req.verify() runs).
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let outer = try #require(TestDER.read(bytes, at: 0))
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let parts = TestDER.children(bytes, outer)
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let infoBytes = Data(bytes[parts[0].start..<parts[0].end])
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let sigContent = parts[2] // BIT STRING: first content byte is unused-bits (0x00)
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let signature = Data(bytes[(sigContent.valueStart + 1)..<sigContent.valueEnd])
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// Rebuild the public SecKey from the X9.63 point and verify.
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let publicKey = try #require(makePublicKey(fromX963: expectedPoint))
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var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
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let ok = SecKeyVerifySignature(
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publicKey,
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.ecdsaSignatureMessageX962SHA256,
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infoBytes as CFData,
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signature as CFData,
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&error
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)
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#expect(ok, "self-signature must verify: \(String(describing: error?.takeRetainedValue()))")
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}
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@Test("CSR embeds a P-256 SubjectPublicKeyInfo the server verifier accepts")
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func csrEmbedsP256Spki() throws {
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// Arrange
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let signer = try makeSoftwareKey()
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let point = [UInt8](try signer.publicKeyX963())
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// Act
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let der = try CertificateSigningRequest.der(
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subjectCommonName: "web-terminal-device", signer: signer
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)
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let bytes = [UInt8](der)
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// certificationRequestInfo → { version, subject, subjectPKInfo, [0] attrs }
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let outer = try #require(TestDER.read(bytes, at: 0))
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let info = TestDER.children(bytes, outer)[0]
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let infoChildren = TestDER.children(bytes, info)
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#expect(infoChildren.count == 4)
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#expect(Array(bytes[infoChildren[0].start..<infoChildren[0].end]) == [0x02, 0x01, 0x00]) // v1(0)
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#expect(infoChildren[3].tag == 0xA0) // [0] IMPLICIT attributes
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#expect(infoChildren[3].valueEnd - infoChildren[3].valueStart == 0) // empty SET
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// subjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier, BIT STRING point }
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let spki = infoChildren[2]
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let spkiChildren = TestDER.children(bytes, spki)
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#expect(spkiChildren.count == 2)
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let algIdChildren = TestDER.children(bytes, spkiChildren[0])
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// AlgorithmIdentifier { id-ecPublicKey, prime256v1 } — the exact OIDs
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// verifyCsrPoPEc pins.
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#expect(Array(bytes[algIdChildren[0].start..<algIdChildren[0].end])
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== [0x06, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01])
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#expect(Array(bytes[algIdChildren[1].start..<algIdChildren[1].end])
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== [0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07])
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// BIT STRING content = 0x00 unused-bits + the exact 65-byte point.
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let bitString = spkiChildren[1]
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#expect(bitString.tag == 0x03)
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#expect(bytes[bitString.valueStart] == 0x00)
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#expect(Array(bytes[(bitString.valueStart + 1)..<bitString.valueEnd]) == point)
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}
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@Test("signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256")
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func csrSignatureAlgorithm() throws {
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let signer = try makeSoftwareKey()
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let der = try CertificateSigningRequest.der(
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subjectCommonName: "web-terminal-device", signer: signer
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)
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let bytes = [UInt8](der)
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let outer = try #require(TestDER.read(bytes, at: 0))
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let algId = TestDER.children(bytes, outer)[1]
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let oid = TestDER.children(bytes, algId)[0]
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#expect(Array(bytes[oid.start..<oid.end])
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== [0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02])
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}
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@Test("empty subject CN is rejected")
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func csrRejectsEmptySubject() throws {
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let signer = try makeSoftwareKey()
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#expect(throws: CertificateSigningRequest.CSRError.invalidSubject) {
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_ = try CertificateSigningRequest.der(subjectCommonName: "", signer: signer)
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}
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}
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// MARK: - helpers
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/// Reconstruct a public SecKey from an X9.63 uncompressed point for verification.
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private func makePublicKey(fromX963 point: Data) -> SecKey? {
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let attributes: [String: Any] = [
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kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom,
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kSecAttrKeyClass as String: kSecAttrKeyClassPublic,
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kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String: 256,
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]
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return SecKeyCreateWithData(point as CFData, attributes as CFDictionary, nil)
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}
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/// A throwaway DER reader for assertions (production parsing lives in
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/// CertificateSummary's X509 walk; this mirrors it for tests).
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enum TestDER {
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struct Element {
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let tag: UInt8
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let start: Int // index of the tag byte
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let valueStart: Int
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let valueEnd: Int
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var end: Int { valueEnd }
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}
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static func read(_ bytes: [UInt8], at start: Int) -> Element? {
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guard start >= 0, start + 1 < bytes.count else { return nil }
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let tag = bytes[start]
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var index = start + 1
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let first = bytes[index]
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index += 1
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var length = 0
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if first & 0x80 == 0 {
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length = Int(first)
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} else {
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let count = Int(first & 0x7F)
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guard count > 0, count <= 4, index + count <= bytes.count else { return nil }
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for _ in 0..<count {
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length = (length << 8) | Int(bytes[index])
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index += 1
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}
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}
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let valueEnd = index + length
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guard valueEnd <= bytes.count else { return nil }
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return Element(tag: tag, start: start, valueStart: index, valueEnd: valueEnd)
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}
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static func children(_ bytes: [UInt8], _ parent: Element) -> [Element] {
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var elements: [Element] = []
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var index = parent.valueStart
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while index < parent.valueEnd, let element = read(bytes, at: index) {
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elements.append(element)
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index = element.valueEnd
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}
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return elements
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}
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}
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