web-terminal/ios/Packages/ClientTLS/Tests/ClientTLSTests/KeychainTestProbe.swift

import Foundation
import Security
@testable import ClientTLS

// B4 · Direct `SecItem*` access for the store tests. Two jobs:
//   1. INSPECT what `KeychainClientIdentityStore` actually wrote — the protection
//      class and the no-iCloud-sync flag are security requirements (plan §5.3 /
//      contract §1.1) that only a raw read can confirm.
//   2. SEED / CORRUPT the persisted records so the read-side error paths and the
//      renew path can be driven without first performing a real enrollment
//      (which would have to install a certificate — see `undecodableCertificateDER`).

/// The keychain coordinates a `KeychainClientIdentityStore(service:account:)`
/// derives internally. Mirrored here ON PURPOSE: the persisted layout is a
/// migration contract, so the tests pin it rather than infer it.
struct StoreKeychainKeys {
    let service: String
    let account: String

    /// `KeychainClientIdentityStore.enrollmentAccount`.
    var enrollmentAccount: String { "\(account).enrollment" }
    /// `KeychainClientIdentityStore.deviceKeyTag`.
    var deviceKeyTag: Data { Data("\(service).device-key".utf8) }
    /// `KeychainClientIdentityStore.leafLabel`.
    var leafLabel: String { "\(service).device-leaf" }

    /// A fresh, collision-free coordinate set for one test.
    static func unique() -> StoreKeychainKeys {
        StoreKeychainKeys(
            service: "com.yaojia.webterm.clienttls.test-\(UUID().uuidString)",
            account: "device-identity"
        )
    }
}

enum KeychainProbe {
    private static func query(service: String, account: String) -> [String: Any] {
        [
            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
            kSecAttrService as String: service,
            kSecAttrAccount as String: account,
        ]
    }

    /// How many generic-password items sit at `(service, account)`. `0` = nothing
    /// stored; `> 1` = a write duplicated instead of replacing.
    ///
    /// Attributes-only, `kSecMatchLimitAll`: asking for `kSecReturnData`
    /// together with `kSecMatchLimitAll` is `errSecParam (-50)` on the macOS
    /// file-based keychain (verified 2026-07-30), so counting and reading are
    /// separate calls.
    static func count(service: String, account: String) -> Int {
        var request = query(service: service, account: account)
        request[kSecReturnAttributes as String] = true
        request[kSecMatchLimit as String] = kSecMatchLimitAll
        var result: CFTypeRef?
        guard SecItemCopyMatching(request as CFDictionary, &result) == errSecSuccess else {
            return 0
        }
        if let array = result as? [Any] { return array.count }
        return result == nil ? 0 : 1
    }

    /// The stored bytes at `(service, account)`; `nil` when no item exists.
    static func data(service: String, account: String) -> Data? {
        var request = query(service: service, account: account)
        request[kSecReturnData as String] = true
        request[kSecMatchLimit as String] = kSecMatchLimitOne
        var result: CFTypeRef?
        guard SecItemCopyMatching(request as CFDictionary, &result) == errSecSuccess else {
            return nil
        }
        return result as? Data
    }

    /// Write raw bytes at `(service, account)` with the store's own protection
    /// class — used to seed or corrupt a record.
    @discardableResult
    static func write(service: String, account: String, data: Data) -> OSStatus {
        SecItemDelete(query(service: service, account: account) as CFDictionary)
        var attributes = query(service: service, account: account)
        attributes[kSecValueData as String] = data
        attributes[kSecAttrAccessible as String] =
            kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly
        return SecItemAdd(attributes as CFDictionary, nil)
    }

    @discardableResult
    static func delete(service: String, account: String) -> OSStatus {
        SecItemDelete(query(service: service, account: account) as CFDictionary)
    }

    /// Remove everything a test could have created under `keys`.
    static func purge(_ keys: StoreKeychainKeys) {
        delete(service: keys.service, account: keys.account)
        delete(service: keys.service, account: keys.enrollmentAccount)
        try? SecureEnclaveKeyFactory.delete(tag: keys.deviceKeyTag)
    }
}

/// The two fields of the stored `.p12` envelope, decoded from the keychain item.
///
/// Compared field-by-field rather than byte-by-byte because Foundation's
/// `JSONEncoder` serializes through an unordered dictionary on Darwin: two
/// encodings of the SAME value differ in key order (verified 2026-07-30 — both
/// blobs 2109 bytes, not equal), so byte equality is not a valid invariant.
func storedP12Fields(service: String, account: String) -> (p12: String, passphrase: String)? {
    guard let data = KeychainProbe.data(service: service, account: account),
          let json = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: Any],
          let p12 = json["p12"] as? String,
          let passphrase = json["passphrase"] as? String
    else { return nil }
    return (p12, passphrase)
}

/// The JSON `StoredEnrollment` shape (`JSONEncoder` defaults: `Data` → base64
/// string, `Date` → seconds since the reference date). Written directly so the
/// read path can be exercised without installing a leaf certificate.
func storedEnrollmentJSON(
    deviceId: String,
    deviceName: String,
    caChain: [Data] = [],
    notAfter: Date? = nil,
    renewAfter: Date? = nil
) -> Data {
    var json: [String: Any] = [
        "deviceId": deviceId,
        "deviceName": deviceName,
        "caChain": caChain.map { $0.base64EncodedString() },
    ]
    if let notAfter { json["notAfter"] = notAfter.timeIntervalSinceReferenceDate }
    if let renewAfter { json["renewAfter"] = renewAfter.timeIntervalSinceReferenceDate }
    return try! JSONSerialization.data(withJSONObject: json)
}