Files
web-terminal/relay-auth/test/mtls.test.ts
Yaojia Wang e7f3bd05f0 feat(tunnel): zero-touch tunnel enrollment — control-plane PKI, host agent, iOS, nginx isolation
Customers install one command / log in once; hardware-generated keys never leave the
device; CSRs return certs + subdomain; frpc + base-app run as durable services. No .p12,
no manual cert import. Implements the MVP fast-path of docs/PLAN_TUNNEL_AUTOMATION.md.

Control-plane / PKI (control-plane/):
- ca/x509-assembler.ts: single KMS-signed real X.509 issuance primitive (Ed25519 + P-256)
- ca/csr-ec.ts: P-256 PKCS#10 proof-of-possession (verifyCsrPoPEc) + CSR-key routing
- ca/frpclient-issue.ts, ca/device-issue.ts: P-256 frp-client + device leaf signers
- ca/rotate.ts + api/renew.ts: real-X.509 /renew + /device/:id/renew (mTLS current cert)
- registry/devices.ts: device registry + per-account cap/rate-limit
- auth/session.ts: device:enroll capability token mint/verify
- api/device-enroll.ts: POST /device/enroll (ownership-gated, deny-by-default)
- pairing/native-redeem.ts + shared gateAndConsumePairingCode; api/provision.ts native arm
- boot/native-ca.ts + main.ts: wire two P-256 CAs + issuers + routers (dev / KMS fail-fast)

Contracts: relay-contracts enroll right; relay-auth SPIFFE /device/ arm + spiffeIdFor(kind)

Host agent (agent/):
- transport/frpcToml.ts; provision/frpcBinary.ts + untar.ts (verify-download + traversal-safe extract)
- keys P-256 keygen/CSR/loadIdentity; service two-unit install + BIND_HOST loopback S-GATE
- net/loopbackLiteral.ts strict guard; health/probe.ts + transport/frpSupervise.ts; cli pair --install

iOS (ios/Packages/ClientTLS): SecureEnclaveKey + CertificateSigningRequest + DeviceEnrollmentClient
+ Keychain enroll refactor (SecKey/Security.framework end-to-end, avoids the -25300 trap)

Isolation (deploy/nginx): njs/getCertSub.js SAN parser + zone-anchored map -> 403

Verified: 758 tests green (control-plane 246, agent 267, relay-auth 133, relay-contracts 85,
iOS ClientTLS 27), all tsc clean; real nginx+njs docker 403/200/400; Swift CSR accepted by
the real control-plane verifier; frpc extract byte-identical to `tar -xO`. Cross-validation
caught + fixed 5 real defects (1 critical, 4 high). Remaining = infra (KMS, nginx deploy,
VPS frps, physical iPhone) per PROGRESS_LOG runbook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 16:11:13 +02:00

158 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
import { spiffeIdFor, parseSpiffeId, SpiffeError } from '../src/agent/spiffe.js'
import {
verifyAgentCert,
defaultParseX509,
splitPemBundle,
type ParsedCert,
} from '../src/agent/verify-mtls.js'
import { shouldRotate, DEFAULT_ROTATION_PLAN } from '../src/agent/rotate.js'
import { fakeHostRegistry, makeHost } from './_helpers.js'
const FIXTURES = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), 'fixtures', 'mtls')
const readFixture = (name: string): string => readFileSync(join(FIXTURES, name), 'utf8')
const NOW = 1_700_000_000
const DOMAIN = 'example.com'
function certParser(cert: ParsedCert) {
return () => cert
}
describe('SPIFFE-ID scheme (T9)', () => {
it('formats and round-trips account/host', () => {
const id = spiffeIdFor('acct-A', 'host-1', DOMAIN)
expect(id).toBe('spiffe://relay.example.com/account/acct-A/host/host-1')
expect(parseSpiffeId(id)).toEqual({ accountId: 'acct-A', id: 'host-1', kind: 'host' })
})
it('rejects a path-traversal / wildcard SPIFFE-ID', () => {
expect(() => parseSpiffeId('spiffe://relay.example.com/account/../host/x')).toThrow()
expect(() => parseSpiffeId('spiffe://relay.example.com/account/*/host/x')).toThrow(SpiffeError)
})
})
describe('agent cert verification (INV4/INV14)', () => {
const enrolled = spiffeIdFor('acct-A', 'host-1', DOMAIN)
const hosts = fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-A', 'host-1')])
const validCert: ParsedCert = {
spiffeUri: enrolled,
notBefore: NOW - 10,
notAfter: NOW + 3600,
chainValid: true,
}
it('accepts an enrolled, in-date, chain-valid cert', async () => {
const r = await verifyAgentCert('leaf', 'ca', NOW, hosts, certParser(validCert))
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: true, hostId: 'host-1', accountId: 'acct-A' })
})
it('refuses a SPIFFE-ID whose host is not in the registry (INV4)', async () => {
const cert = { ...validCert, spiffeUri: spiffeIdFor('acct-A', 'host-unknown', DOMAIN) }
const r = await verifyAgentCert('leaf', 'ca', NOW, hosts, certParser(cert))
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'host_not_enrolled' })
})
it('refuses an expired leaf', async () => {
const cert = { ...validCert, notAfter: NOW - 1 }
const r = await verifyAgentCert('leaf', 'ca', NOW, hosts, certParser(cert))
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'expired' })
})
it('refuses a SPIFFE-ID account mismatch (cert account ≠ registry account)', async () => {
const cert = { ...validCert, spiffeUri: spiffeIdFor('acct-B', 'host-1', DOMAIN) }
const r = await verifyAgentCert('leaf', 'ca', NOW, hosts, certParser(cert))
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'spiffe_account_mismatch' })
})
it('refuses a chain that does not verify against the CA', async () => {
const cert = { ...validCert, chainValid: false }
const r = await verifyAgentCert('leaf', 'ca', NOW, hosts, certParser(cert))
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'chain_invalid' })
})
it('refuses a device-kind cert on the host channel even if the id collides with an enrolled host (kind guard)', async () => {
// Trust-broadening guard: a /device/ SAN whose id happens to equal an enrolled hostId
// (same account) must NOT be accepted by the host-agent verifier. The host channel is
// host-only; device certs are enforced at nginx :8470, not here.
const cert = { ...validCert, spiffeUri: spiffeIdFor('acct-A', 'host-1', DOMAIN, 'device') }
const r = await verifyAgentCert('leaf', 'ca', NOW, hosts, certParser(cert))
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'not_host_cert' })
})
})
describe('defaultParseX509 real X.509 path validation (INV4/INV14)', () => {
const leafPem = readFixture('leaf.pem')
const caChainPem = readFixture('ca-chain.pem') // intermediate + root
const rootPem = readFixture('root.pem')
const intermediatePem = readFixture('intermediate.pem')
const foreignLeafPem = readFixture('foreign-leaf.pem')
it('splits a multi-cert PEM bundle into every certificate', () => {
expect(splitPemBundle(caChainPem)).toHaveLength(2)
expect(splitPemBundle(rootPem)).toHaveLength(1)
expect(splitPemBundle('')).toHaveLength(0)
})
it('parses the SPIFFE SAN, validity window, and validates the full chain', () => {
const parsed = defaultParseX509(leafPem, caChainPem)
expect(parsed.spiffeUri).toBe(spiffeIdFor('acct-A', 'host-1', DOMAIN))
expect(parsed.chainValid).toBe(true)
expect(parsed.notAfter).toBeGreaterThan(parsed.notBefore)
})
it('refuses when the intermediate is missing (root-only anchor is not a single hop)', () => {
// Real path validation: leaf is signed by the intermediate, not the root directly.
// A single-hop check against the first bundle cert would wrongly pass; chain walking refuses.
expect(defaultParseX509(leafPem, rootPem).chainValid).toBe(false)
})
it('refuses when no trusted self-signed root terminates the path (intermediate only)', () => {
expect(defaultParseX509(leafPem, intermediatePem).chainValid).toBe(false)
})
it('refuses a leaf signed by a foreign CA not in the trusted bundle', () => {
expect(defaultParseX509(foreignLeafPem, caChainPem).chainValid).toBe(false)
})
it('refuses when the CA bundle is empty', () => {
expect(defaultParseX509(leafPem, '').chainValid).toBe(false)
})
it('end-to-end: verifyAgentCert accepts the real enrolled leaf with the production parser', async () => {
const hosts = fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-A', 'host-1')])
const parsed = defaultParseX509(leafPem, caChainPem)
const now = parsed.notBefore + 60 // fixtures are long-lived; sample inside the validity window
const r = await verifyAgentCert(leafPem, caChainPem, now, hosts, defaultParseX509)
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: true, hostId: 'host-1', accountId: 'acct-A' })
})
it('end-to-end: verifyAgentCert refuses the real foreign leaf (chain_invalid) with the production parser', async () => {
const hosts = fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-A', 'host-1')])
const parsed = defaultParseX509(foreignLeafPem, caChainPem)
const now = parsed.notBefore + 60
const r = await verifyAgentCert(foreignLeafPem, caChainPem, now, hosts, defaultParseX509)
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'chain_invalid' })
})
it('reports unparseable_cert when the leaf PEM is garbage', async () => {
const hosts = fakeHostRegistry([makeHost('acct-A', 'host-1')])
const r = await verifyAgentCert('not-a-cert', caChainPem, NOW, hosts, defaultParseX509)
expect(r).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'unparseable_cert' })
})
})
describe('rotation policy (T9)', () => {
it('false when fresh, true at ~50% TTL, true after expiry', () => {
const ttl = DEFAULT_ROTATION_PLAN.certTtlSeconds
const issuedAt = NOW
const notAfter = issuedAt + ttl
expect(shouldRotate(notAfter, issuedAt + 1, DEFAULT_ROTATION_PLAN)).toBe(false)
expect(shouldRotate(notAfter, issuedAt + ttl / 2, DEFAULT_ROTATION_PLAN)).toBe(true)
expect(shouldRotate(notAfter, notAfter + 100, DEFAULT_ROTATION_PLAN)).toBe(true)
})
})